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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

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April 26, 2023

The Honorable Christopher A. Wray
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Director Wray,

Following the arrest on April 17 of two agents of the Chinese Communist Party, Lu Jianwang and Chen Jinping, the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) requests additional information regarding the FBI's efforts to address the very significant threat that transnational repression poses to the American people.

We appreciated the classified briefing the FBI provided to Select Committee Members on March 30 in response to our February 24 request. However, we are disappointed that the briefing failed to provide a response to any of our questions listed in our initial letter and that it did not inform Select Committee Members about the FBI's efforts to address the very significant threat of transnational repression by the CCP. For that reason, we seek additional information on this timely and important matter.

On February 24, we wrote you regarding the illegal operation of People's Republic of China (PRC) law enforcement in the United States as part of the CCP's broader efforts to undermine American security and extend its techno-totalitarian reach beyond the PRC's borders.¹ We expressed our concern that the FBI was not aware of the presence of PRC law enforcement officials in the United States and acted only after a think tank reported on open-source information.² In September 2022, human rights organization Safeguard Defenders identified more

¹ Letter from Hon. Mike Gallagher, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on CCP, to Hon. Christopher Wray, Director, FBI (Feb. 24, 2023) available at <https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/fbi-letter.pdf>.

² *Id.*

than one hundred illegal PRC police stations across the world.³ Only after this report and after concerns were raised by members of Congress did it appear the FBI took action.

On April 17, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that it had arrested two individuals “in connection with opening and operating an illegal overseas police station in lower Manhattan, New York, for a provincial branch of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) of the People’s Republic of China.”⁴ According to the DOJ, the FBI did not conduct a search of the secret police station until October 2022—a month after the Safeguard Defenders report—raising concerns that the FBI was unaware of the illegal operation prior to the public reporting. We seek to understand how the FBI is proactively monitoring PRC transnational repression operations.

In our February 24 letter, we listed specific questions for the FBI to answer in a classified briefing. These included:

1. Before the issuance of the Safeguard Defenders report, was the FBI aware that the PRC had a law enforcement outpost in New York City?
2. Is the FBI aware of any other such outposts in the United States?
3. What steps has the FBI taken to investigate whether any other such outposts exist in the U.S. and, if so, what steps has the FBI taken to close these outposts? Is the FBI adequately equipped with the resources, personnel, and legal tools to track the activities of the PRC in the United States?
4. What role do these outposts play in PRC intelligence gathering in the United States?
5. Have these outposts targeted American residents and/or American citizens, and what steps is the FBI taking to protect American citizens and residents?
6. What role do these facilities play in the CCP’s Operation Fox Hunt or Operation Skynet?
7. Has the FBI engaged with the State Department to address this issue with its PRC counterparts or with U.S. partners and allies who may host similar facilities?

During our March 30 briefing, we were disappointed that the FBI provided only vague information—virtually all of which could be found in public reporting—which did not address any of the questions above.

³ *110 Overseas: Chinese Transnational Policing Gone Wild*, SAFEGUARD DEFENDERS (Sep. 2022) available at <https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default/files/pdf/110%20Overseas%20%28v5%29.pdf>.

⁴ *Two Arrested for Operating Illegal Overseas Police Station of the Chinese Government*, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 17, 2023) available at <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-arrested-operating-illegal-overseas-police-station-chinese-government>.

In light of our continued concern, we respectfully request that the FBI provide written responses to the questions above, which are also listed in our February 24 letter, as well as additional questions listed below, no later than May 10, 2023.

1. What is the FBI's strategy and policy for investigating and combating transnational repression? Please provide documents and information relating to this matter.
2. What guidance has been issued to FBI field offices about investigating transnational repression? Please provide documents and information relating to this matter.
3. What investigations did the FBI conduct on PRC police stations in the United States before Safeguard Defenders released its the report in September 2022? Please provide documents and information relating to this matter.
4. How has the FBI collaborated with other federal departments and agencies on investigating and combating secret police stations in the United States? Please provide documents and information relating to this matter.
5. Please state when the FBI opened cases involving CCP's transnational repression, including for individuals charged this month by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York.

After the written responses and documents are provided, we request another classified briefing with relevant officials, no later than May 31, 2023, who will be both able and willing to discuss and answer questions arising from the written responses and documents.

The threat of PRC transnational repression schemes that target U.S. citizens—primarily Chinese Americans—undermines the foundational American principles of freedom and liberty. United States law enforcement agencies must hold these perpetrators to account and better protect the U.S. from future threats.

The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party has broad authority to “investigate and submit policy recommendations on the status of the Chinese Communist Party’s economic, technological, and security progress and its competition with the United States” under H. Res. 11.


To make arrangements to deliver a response, please contact Select Committee staff at (202) 226-9678.

Thank you for your attention to this important matter and your prompt reply.

Sincerely,



Mike Gallagher
Chairman




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Member of Congress



Rob Wittman
Member of Congress



Blaine Luetkemeyer
Member of Congress




Andy Barr
Member of Congress




John Moolenaar
Member of Congress




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
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