How should we feel about the GCC’s intervention in Bahrain? Kori Schake offers insight into a thorny question:
The GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force was created to “deter, and respond to, military aggression against any of the GCC member countries.” But the Bahraini government is not subject to military aggression — it is under “attack” by its own citizens, peacefully protesting for political rights.
In fairness, the government of Bahrain has offered an expansion of political rights in response to the protests. But as autocrats from the Shah of Iran to Hosni Mubarak could attest, offers that would earlier have mollified reformers can embolden resistance once the invisible line from reform to revolution has been crossed.
The monarchies of the GCC states claim agitation for political change is the product of Iranian influence, an effort by to radicalize and destabilize their countries. And they may not be wrong about Iranian efforts: Shi’ia Iran has long sought to delegitimize those Sunni regimes, supported seizure of the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia in 1979, infiltrated Iraq to foment anti-government violence, and openly supported destruction by Hamas and Hezbollah. But the GCC governments deceive themselves about the depth of popular support for political change in their countries.
I have a narrower point. If the strategic footprint of the U.S. shrinks after a decade of expansion — after the 2001 terror attacks, U.S. influence expanded deep into the heart of Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere — other countries, including countries we consider unsavory, will pick up the strategic slack. This was a central part of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy during the détente era: Vietnamization was part of a broader concept of relying on proxy states, like Iran under the Shah, to contain Soviet expansion rather than to rely solely on American power. These archrealists also believed that this was a step on the road to a multipolar world. Basically, I think we’re going to see more interventions like the movement of Saudi troops into Bahrain, and there’s not much we can do about it. Buckle up.
I also recommend Bernard Haykel’s thoughts on Saudi Arabia’s future. I wish he could’ve written more:
The so-called “Day of Rage” did not come off last week because the Shiites, about 10 percent of the population, made a terrible blunder by demonstrating early and frequently, thereby giving a sectarian tinge to what otherwise would have been a national movement for reform.
The Shiites gave the Sunnis, who make up 90 percent of the population, an excuse to bond together. Furthermore, the regime in Riyadh, which has been stating that Iran is behind many of the revolts in Bahrain and elsewhere, was able to confirm some of its claims when the Shiites started demonstrating, with and without provocation from Riyadh. And now that Saudi troops have entered Bahrain, presumably to quell Shiite-led protests and to back its Sunni rulers, Riyadh is signaling that any opposition to its rule will be considered part of a broader Iranian plot against it.
A question for America’s strategic thinkers: how deeply enmeshed in these conflicts do we really want to be? Given Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth, we don’t have much choice. But we should at least agree that this is a situation fraught with danger.