Check out Elbridge Colby’s short post on the case for containing Iran. I don’t have a settled opinion on this issue, and many people I trust take strong exception to Bridge’s confidence in the Iranian regime’s basic rationality. But I found Bridge’s contribution worthwhile:
While Netanyahu correctly set out the hostile and in many cases despicable actions of the Iranian regime, he does not show that it is irrational. Classical deterrence — the threat of violence upon provocation — does not require some kind of optimal, neo-classical economics rationality. In its pure form, it requires the rationality of Darwin. If one’s (real) red lines are crossed, one’s opponent should fear death or destruction. The available evidence certainly suggests that the Tehran regime exhibits this kind of rationality. After all, they’ve held on to power in a tough neighborhood for over thirty years, indicating that they know how to stay alive despite being under threat from stronger states. Reports suggest that China and Russia, Iranexperts, and the U.S. intelligence community all view the Iranian regime as fundamentally sensitive to cost-benefit calculations. Thus, if Tehran is credibly threatened with harm if it takes some aggressive action, there is very good reason to think the Iranian regime’s behavior will be channeled away from such action.
I want to stress that Bridge isn’t suggesting that it is remotely acceptable that Iran’s leaders make incendiary statements about Israel and Jewish communities throughout the world, etc. Rather, he’s arguing that the Iranian regime is invested in its own survival. With that in mind, Bridge believes that the Iranian regime can be kept in a box at a manageable cost:
Basically, the West would presumably require that Tehran not invade or use military (especially nuclear) coercion against protected states (e.g., Israel, the GCC, as well as NATO and other allies of Washington). For the equation to balance, the West would have to guarantee that it would not use military force to overthrow the regime, thus giving Tehran a strong incentive to stick with the status quo. The essential choice Iran would face would be to embark on aggression that would likely prompt tremendous retaliation or respect the West’s boundaries and enjoy immunity from invasion. While Netanyahu implied that an Iran armed with a weapon would be far more aggressive, this calculus instead suggests it would be boxed in. How, precisely, could they aggressively use their nuclear weapons that would make sense?
I don’t like the idea of being soft on Iran, not least because I find Iran’s active efforts to undermine Israel’s security extremely provocative. I also think that we need to weigh our options carefully in a dangerous world.