Greece was taken over by a leftist firebrand who headed an ostentatiously socialist political party. That was in 1981. Things turned out OK (for a while), but current Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras lacks the intellectual and political preparation of Andreas Papandreou – and Tsipras certainly lacks Papandreou’s experience of hard knocks. My 2012 First Things post on the differences between Tsipras and Papandreou holds up pretty well (some grammar issues aside), but the difference is not just at the leadership level. The situation for Tsipras in 2015 is much more difficult than the one faced by Papandreou in 1981.
Papandreou came to power in a country that had an affordable state sector, favorable demographics (for the moment – trouble was on the horizon), and had experienced decades of economic growth. Papandreou could buy support through expanding the patronage state and offering more generous pensions. This resulted in a bloated, corrupt state sector and unsustainable pension obligations, but Papandreou knew that that the wreck would come only after he was safely dead. Papandreou was a bad guy, but he was numerate and he had learned realism the hard way (getting arrested by the same Greek military that had deposed his father in a coup).
Papandreou also had a stronger political position. Papandreou had two runs as prime minister. The first was from 1981-1989 and the second was from 1993-1996 (when he retired due to illness). Papandreou’s party had comfortable majorities in Greece’s 300 seat parliament. Papandreou could (and did) ruthlessly expel intraparty critics without fear that doing so would bring down his government.
Syriza is just short of a majority in the Greek parliament and is dependent on an alliance with the nominally right-wing (but really just a bunch of hacks) Independent Greeks to form a government. The Independent Greeks were given the Defense Ministry and not much else in the Syriza-led government. That makes sense. The Defense Ministry is a good place for serious graft. Small, populist parties have participated in the last two Greek governments and those parties soon broke off when it became clear that participation in governing was destroying their credibility as a protest parties. Independent Greeks is likely to suffer the same fate if Greece’s economy does not recover very swiftly.
If Panos Kammenos (the leader of Independent Greeks) sees his party’s popularity slipping, he would have two choices. He could hang on and grab as much loot as possible even as his party’s electoral support collapses, or he could try to save his party by going back into opposition and bringing down the Tsipras government. The politicians of Independent Greeks are all about business, but there is a vast cultural gulf between the activist base of Syriza and culturally conservative voting base of Independent Greeks. There will always be pretexts for Independent Greeks to walk out. Loyalty to Syriza and Tsipras will play no part in the calculations of the Independent Greeks.
To maintain popular support and keep his parliamentary coalition together, Tsipras has to deliver the goods. He needs not only debt relief, but also the fiscal space to increase spending. He needs the ECB to back the Greek banking system even as he reverses the economic reforms designed to make Greece competitive. So far, Tsipras has been working hard to make himself obnoxious to the Northern Europeans whose help he will need.
Germany, the EU and the ECB should consider whether Tsipras is someone with who they want to make a deal (and whether he is someone who can be trusted to implement a deal). All rhetoric aside, Tsipras needs them much more than they need Greece in the eurozone. If I were the Greek opposition, I would be making plans for governing a Greece that was back on the drachma.