As part of the “deal” struck with the Castro regime by the Obama administration, the 53 prisoners have apparently been released as promised. Though of course this deal, even if nominally adhered too, doesn’t amount to much, even for the prisoners. As reported in the Washington Free Beacon:
The 53 prisoners released by Cuba’s communist government still face restrictions on their movements and political freedoms and could eventually wind up in jail again, according to reports…Now out of prison, many must report to courts regularly as part of their “conditional release.” Those on parole are barred from leaving the country. Others say they were urged to refrain from political activities.
Did people in the United States government think that these prisoners wouldn’t face such restrictions? Have they not heard of the practice of “protective supervision” where dissidents, while not in jail, are forced to confine themselves to a small area with strict, in-person reporting requirements sometimes twice per day? Are our negotiators unaware of the practice of holding someone for the maximum period without charge (e.g., 48 hours), releasing them, only to have the picked up minutes later by a different set of state officials? “Urged to refrain from political activities” is rather gentle, no? The “urging,” we can be sure, included threats of violence, further imprisonment, and a range of social pressures too broad to enumerate. Did the U.S. government think that “release,” for these prisoners, would mean the freedom to think, speak, and write freely?
The root of the problem is the near impossibility of good faith negotiation with a totalitarian regime. Such a regime, in the words of former Czech dissident and statesman Vaclav Benda, regards “any compromise as absurd since it neither desires nor is it able to recognize any limit to itself—nor is it able to tolerate the existence of any real partner. Nevertheless, it is happy to agree to such compromises and even make them one of the chief theoretical and practical weapons of its expansion.” In this case, of course, the regime suddenly looks reasonable and humane—it just needed a real partner on our end to see the irrationality of its needless isolation! And though this should be obvious, Benda reminds us, “On the side of the totalitarian power, these contracts are absolutely non-binding.”
It’s heads the Cuban regime wins, tails we lose. The Cuban dissidents deserve better friends than the United States government.