Issues on national security call for serious, unillusioned discussion within the U.S. and between the U.S and its allies.
There is every reason to be concerned about the dangerous fiasco at the southern border and, for that matter, signs of growing illegal immigration from the north too. The administration’s failures in this area are, as it knows perfectly well, an area of political vulnerability, and, as we enter an election year, that ought to offer leverage to those who rightly want to see tougher immigration enforcement.
But legitimate worries about the security of this country’s actual border are not a reason to wish away worries about threats to American security from further abroad, including from Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
There are certainly some arguments to disagree with in this Financial Times piece by Edward Luce, but not (in my view) in this section:
Republicans are split between staunch supporters of Ukraine and a blend of isolationists and overt Putinistas. JD Vance, a senator from Ohio, is a mix of the last two. “You have some people in this town saying we need to cut social security and throw our grandparents into poverty. Why? So that one of Zelenskyy’s ministers can buy a bigger yacht?” Vance said this week.
Few of the arguments against backing Ukraine stand up to scrutiny. Most American aid is spent at home on US-made weapons, not in Ukraine. Ukraine funding amounts to less than 1 per cent of the US federal budget. The American dollars that do go to Kyiv in fiscal support are closely audited; nothing is going on superyachts. There is little basis for public fatigue with the Ukraine war since no Americans are actually fighting it.
The loudest siren song is that every dollar America spends on Ukraine is a dollar less to defend Taiwan. The reality is closer to the opposite. China and Russia have a “no-limits” partnership that aims to weaken America. The most effective way of achieving this is with a Russian victory in Ukraine. That would demoralise Nato and deliver Europe’s breadbasket into Russia’s lap. As military strategists have pointed out for more than a century, whoever controls Ukraine controls Eurasia. By the same token, every artillery piece that America sends to Ukraine is another reason for China to think twice on Taiwan. . . .
To suggest that all is going well with the war that Ukraine is fighting (lest we forget) for its survival would be absurd. There are clear signs of division in Kyiv, the counter-offensive has fallen short of (unrealistic) expectations, and Russia is not only digging in, but is well-placed to tough out a war of attrition.
In early November the German Council on Foreign Relations produced a useful report on “Preventing the Next War.” Among its authors’ conclusions:
Russia can train about 280,000 recruits per year. In six years, this adds up to nearly 1.7 million and in ten years to 2.8 million people with military training. By training in the units that currently fight in Ukraine, recruits will benefit from their combat experience.
Currently, Russia is using revenue from its oil and gas exports to transform its arms industry into a war industry. It has boosted output in some segments and kept important workers in production. At the same time, it has managed to circumvent Western sanctions on components considered crucial to the war effort like microchips or ball bearings and raw materials. In addition, Russia imports arms and munitions from allied states such as Iran and North Korea.
Russia faces fewer major challenges than the West regarding the resilience of its society. The regime violently suppresses every emergence of civil society. Society’s willingness to accept the loss of human life is obviously great, as the war in Ukraine has already cost Russia over 250,000 dead and wounded. Economically, the state appears to be able to continue financing its war.
To me, sadly, this seems credible enough. Ukraine’s troubles cannot be wished away, nor can Russia’s strengths or, for that matter, its longer-term ambitions, which will not be satisfied with the subjugation and then elimination of Ukrainian nationhood.
These issues call for serious, unillusioned discussion within the U.S. and between the U.S and its allies. But to starve Ukraine now of the resources it needs to stay in the fight, will (regardless of any other considerations) ensure that deciding the next step that the U.S. should take will be taken against a background in which this country has already drastically (and unnecessarily) narrowed its options, while broadening those of Putin and his accomplices in Beijing and Tehran. Quite how that is a good thing escapes me.