The Corner

Talking to Syria

Sorry for dropping out of the conversation. I may be the last person in Washington to neither have cable television nor anything more the dial-up internet.

 

So, Syria said yes on the 15th visit? A few observations of why holding out hope for this is counterproductive:

  • When the Secretary of State must go multiple times to Damascus, it suggests to Syrians and regional players that Washington is the supplicant.
  • Syria values the process of dialogue over substance. When Assad can win international legitimacy, be welcomed in Washington, receive foreign investment all by taking part in the process, why take the risks of any agreement?
  • None of the visits by the Secretaries of State resulted in closure of terrorist offices in Damascus.
  • The shuttle diplomacy also resulted in a carte blanche for Syria to violate the Taif Accords and consume Lebanon. It should not be our place to sacrifice Lebanon. Heck, Syria refuses even to send an ambassador to Beirut because it simply does not recognize Lebanon’s right to exist as an independent country.
  • Bashar al-Assad has violated every agreement he has made with Washington.
  • Given Syria’s role in this, we risk making a mistake with premature recourse to diplomacy. Engagement now would signal reconsideration of UNSCR 1559—which paved the way for the Cedar Revolution—by suggesting that rogue regimes could reverse such international consensus through violence. Assad also wants talk to shield him from the UN’s Brammertz Commission investigating the murder of Rafiq Hariri which he, at present, is stonewalling.

So what to do?

  • Our traditional diplomacy is about coddling our adversaries and neglecting our friends. We shouldn’t incentivize bad behavior. We shouldn’t repeat the mistakes of Clinton’s 1994 deal with North Korea, Europe’s engagement with Iran, and Condoleezza Rice’s May 31 offer to Iran.
  • Better we shower our friends with carrots, and make friendship with Washington mean something; let our adversaries make a realist calculation on their own about whether rogue behavior really pays.
Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Civil-Military Relations, and a senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly.
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