The Corner

The Krepinevich Piece

Just read it. He’s a very well-respected guy and this is a serious, constructive piece. I was a little underwhelmed, however, given the play it received from David Brooks on Sunday as the new strategy that will win the Iraq war. A couple of things:

–He calls for more embedding of US troops in Iraqi units. This is something we are already doing. More of it may very well be a good idea, but it’s not a seachange in strategy.

–He calls for Iraqi units to hold territory and protect it from insurgents. This too seems like a fine idea, but where do we get the Iraqi units? My understanding is that one reason we have been sweeping, clearing, and not holding is that we want Iraqi units to do the holding, but we don’t have them yet.

–He advocates striking a “grand bargain” among a critical mass of all Iraq groups. This is obviously key, and something we’ve already been working very, very hard at. So this isn’t calling for something new at all. The big question, of course, is, What happens if said groups aren’t interested in said bargain?

–Finally, Brooks suggests that the Krepinevich approach hasn’t been tried because it violates the “Rumsfeldian” obsession with a “light, lean force” and instead demands “a heavy troop presence.” I was surprised, therefore, to see that Krepinevich says we could adopt his strategy with fewer troops than now, 120,000 rather than 140,000. As the Iraqi government and security forces stand up, he says we could go down to 60,000. Is it just me, or isn’t this the sort of progression that the Pentagon has been talking about for a long time? (Of course, the timetable is key.)

Anyway, it’s a great piece and well-worth reading. If anyone out there has takes on it, let me know and I’ll post them. One idea that definitely seems worth adopting is having longer tours for our successful generals in Iraq. A lot of what Krepinevich discuss in terms of the interaction between security, politics, and reconstruction reminded me of things Gen. Pete Chiarelli had told me about his approach in Baghdad. But he left after a year.

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