In the course of an article for TNR on the increasingly threatening euro-zone crisis, William Galston argues in favor of insulting Germany (although he doesn’t mean it that way):
Until now, the ability of the United States to influence Eurozone policy has been modest, and many of our efforts to do so have produced resentment. So what is President Obama to do? If he believes, as I think he should, that the global economy, U.S. economy, and his own electoral prospects all hang in the balance, then he should call Merkel and propose a quick summit between the two leaders and their respective economic teams. He should come armed with a menu of concrete steps that the United States and major international institutions would be willing to take if Germany were to change course. He should appeal to Germany’s self-interest as the major beneficiary of the expanded export market the Eurozone has created. He should remind Merkel of the sacrifices that the United States made over many decades to help build a Europe that is free, whole, and united. And he should make it clear in private, and announce in public, that from the American standpoint, what touches all concerns all: Chancellor Merkel is not free to proceed as though the current crisis affects only Germany (or Europe) and the rest of the world has no legitimate say in the outcome.
I take the point (who could not?) about the sacrifices that the United States has made in the interests of helping build a Europe that is “free, whole, and united.” The problem is that perpetuating the euro in its current form may well shrink Europe’s democracy, increase its divisions and put on a brake on its prosperity. As such it risks reversing a great deal of what those American sacrifices have wrought.
Curiously, Mr. Galston has nothing to say about the hundreds of billions that Germany has poured into the EU over, to borrow his phrase on the duration of American generosity, “many decades” (stingy is not something the Germans have been). Nor does he seem too bothered about paying much attention to the opinions of German voters. In that latter respect, he has a great deal in common with those who assembled the single currency. That’s not a good thing.
There’s also the little matter of the German constitution (a real obstacle to some of the proposed euro-zone remedies) to consider. Or is that to count for next to nothing too?
That’s not to say that there’s nothing (more) that Germany could be doing, or should be doing, but subjecting itself to the sort of lecture that Mr. Galston envisions is not one of them.
On a rather different note, Ambrose Evans Pritchard has details of a cunning plan . . .