For the first time in the race, it’s time for Blunt to think about how he changes the momentum. Here are some thoughts a Hill watcher sent me on one approach to doing it:
It is no secret that Blunt is badly losing the outside game—as evidenced by the links to various blog entries and newspaper editorials NRO has been posting, which accurately reflect the fact that he isn’t getting any of that kind of support. While those outside groups appear to be having more impact on the race than they have in the past, how much is open to question. What is not in question is that the outsiders’ views of Blunt will have an effect on how his victory is interpreted.
If Blunt had been coronated and come out with a strong or even moderately strong reform package, he would probably have been able to get at least the right side of the blogosphere and the media (including some of the same people who have been criticizing him) to present it as a real turning of the corner. Once it became clear that there was a race, if he had done something dramatic to associate himself with reform he could also have pulled it off. For whatever reason, that opportunity was lost. Now if he did something dramatic it would look like panic.
The script that is being written is: a Blunt victory is a vote for stand-pattism and for nonchalance about the political threats to the House GOP. The more members believe that proposition, the less likely his victory will be.
Under the circumstances, what he needs to do is to hang a lantern on his problem. At this point he cannot out-reform Shadegg even by coming out for stronger reforms than Shadegg. (Blunt won’t get any credit, for example, for being more reformist than Shadegg on privately-funded travel, or for having proposed an end to the Indian-tribe “loophole” in the campaign-finance laws.)
What he can do is to make it clear to the House Republicans that he is aware of the dimensions of the political problem, that he has a plan for dealing with it, and that the plan begins with a rejection of the planted axioms that have dominated this race so far.
To begin with: He needs to make the case that the last ten years of Republican rule, and even the last five, have not been entirely ignoble. The way to respond to the Republicans’ political troubles is not to accept the Democratic/right-wing blogger portrayal of the last five years as a corrupt waste of time and not to repudiate everything associated with Tom DeLay.
He needs, that is, to accept the need for reforms and to admit that the party has lost its way in some respects but also to fight the impulse to panic or to self-flagellate. He needs to point out that while the House leadership and the House conference has not been blameless or perfect, the Republicans’ political troubles and disappointments in 2005 have not been primarily or even largely their fault. They’re not the reason Social Security reform failed, they’re not the reason the Iraq war has been politically troublesome (and they’re not even the major reason spending has gone up). Reform without repudiation; the baby, not the bathwater. From tax cuts to health savings accounts to the Roberts and Alito confirmations, the Republican “machine” of which Blunt is a part has accomplished more since 2001 than Republicans did in the previous four years. And that “machine” is composed of good and capable people and can reform itself.
Maintaining this double-sided message is admittedly a tall order. But it would have the advantage of appealing to the residual support for DeLay within the conference: the sense that while he has made mistakes, he has also gotten a raw deal. It would appeal to the residual self-respect of the conference, too. If he delivers this sort of message with authority, he will give an impression of direction and leadership rather than of bouncing around from event to event. I think he can avoid the charge of complacency, too, in a way, because it will obviously represent an un-complacent (though also unpanicked) response to his personal political situation.
Blunt may win the race without following this course. But I think following this course would increase his likelihood of winning the race. It would also make his winning less of a pr hit to the party than the present course stands to be. It may be an imperfect message, but it is better than the no message he has. He is getting the pr disadvantages of being the machine candidate without getting any (messaging) upside.
Finally, if he pulled off this strategy, it would be an impressive demonstration that he has the political skills—both the forceful and the delicate kind—to lead the majority.