Picking up the thread from the other day…
E-mail:
Rich:
For the nascent Iraqi forces, my only requirement is the ability to stand, fight and recover. Any ratings system is partly subjective. I suspect the advisors are using a system of ratings based on “mission essential tasks”, abbreviated as the METL. A unit could not be rated in category 1 unless it can perform 100% of the tasks defined as key to success in combat. This is a high standard. US Army battalions spend an entire year working up from squad to battalion operations. And we have a framework of experienced officers and NCOs to staff our battalions. I also trust that the residual institutional memory of Vietnamization provides lessons learned about trying to make the new Iraqi forces a clone of the US Army. We do not want to make the Iraqis dependent on advanced US technology which disappears when we depart. Counter insurgency is down and dirty infantry and police operations. Up close and personal combat. The Iraqis don’t need tank and artillery battalions.
Derb might find Lewis Sorley’s book “A Better War” informative. If you rank Vietnamization a failure, we are batting .500. We raised and trained the Republic of Korea Army. An accomplishment too frequently overlooked.
This is a question of political will. We can either devote the resources to raising an Iraqi Army capable of sustained operations, or we can “declare victory” and pull out our forces. There is no cultural reason why Iraqis can not be trained and motivated to fight. Historically the poor performance of modern Arab armies brings to mind a description of the Italian Army’s performance, “Lions led by donkeys.”