We should not expect the current policy of Whac-A-Mole from the air and sea to be any sort of a solution.
Jim, I hear you on the concern (or lack thereof) over the “severe ecological disaster” that could result from the Houthis sinking a crude-oil tanker in the Red Sea. But, while I agree that the environmental factor is one that should be taken seriously, what we are witnessing in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a disaster of a potentially much greater significance: The sun may be setting on the Anglo-American guarantee of the security of the sea-lines of communication, a guarantee that has ensured our prosperity and safety for 200 years.
It remains an astonishing fact that Joe Biden — he is, after all, still the president — and his administration seem remarkably unperturbed by the fact that an Iran-aligned Islamist group has managed to threaten one of the world’s key oceanic shipping routes and access to the Suez Canal without suffering a catastrophic setback by allied naval forces. What’s more, this tenuous and unacceptable situation has endured for almost a full year’s time.
I mean no disrespect to the U.S. Navy or the sailors that have been, as Jim writes, conducting one of the most extended periods of combat by our navy, or any navy, since the Second World War.
What I mean is that this is a total failure of American policy and strategy at the highest levels.
Since October 7, 2023, U.S. and allied forces have shot down hundreds of drones, missiles, and rockets fired from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen. We have targeted shore-based launchers, logistics hubs, and Houthi command-and-control nodes. We have used state-of-the-art kill chains to identify and prosecute targets. We have used the most advanced precision-guided munitions in our arsenals. We have caused a lot of damage to the Houthi military infrastructure. And we have eliminated a fair number of Houthi militants.
Nearly everything we’ve done has demonstrated the professionalism, commitment to duty, and technological know-how of American naval forces operating in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
But what we have manifestly not done is convince the Houthis that it is a very, very bad idea to shoot at U.S. warships or friendly merchantmen transiting international waters. We have failed to deter the Houthis and their allies in Tehran.
There’s a lesson here, if we care to learn it: Even with advanced munitions, signals-intelligence infrastructure, and high-tech delivery platforms, modern naval forces will struggle to win a long-term campaign to neutralize a determined enemy who wishes to exert influence over strategic littoral chokepoints if the naval force is not combined with some ability to influence events on shore.
I am not suggesting that the American people have the appetite to send the Marines into Yemen, whatever the merits of that idea. And I’m not suggesting that our so-called allies on the Arabian Peninsula — the Saudis, the Omanis, and the Emiratis — or other powers in the region such as the Egyptians will be of any help at all.
What I am suggesting is that we should not expect the current policy of Whac-A-Mole from the air and sea to be any sort of a solution to what is a very serious problem. Are we prepared to cede the free transit of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to the whims of the mullahs in Tehran? Well, we’re living through it.
One must of course wonder what lessons the failure of U.S. naval strategy at the choke point between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are teaching our adversaries in Iran and China. How will the U.S. Navy’s inability to get the Houthis to quit shooting at us or merchant shipping on the high seas translate to a no-kidding shooting war in the Strait of Hormuz or a Chinese-imposed blockade in the Taiwan Strait? We haven’t yet faced that eventuality, thank God. But make no mistake: America’s enemies are no friends of American sea power. They revel in the idea of breaking it. Is America committed to maintaining American naval supremacy?