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Aid to Ukraine Is a Small Fraction of the U.S. Defense Budget

Ukrainian servicemen attend a national flag raising ceremony in Kherson, Ukraine, recently recaptured by Ukrainian Armed Forces, November 14, 2022. (Ukrainian Presidential Press Service/Handout via Reuters)

A new analysis by the Center for European Policy Analysis finds that congressionally approved funds to support Ukraine this year amount to about 5.6 percent of U.S. defense spending, while resulting in a significant degrading of Russia’s military:

Altogether, the Biden administration received Congressional approval for $40bn in aid for Ukraine for 2022 and has requested an additional $37.7bn for 2022. More than half of this aid has been earmarked for defense.

These sums pale into insignificance when set against a total US defense budget of $715bn for 2022. The assistance represents 5.6% of total US defense spending. But Russia is a primary adversary of the US, a top tier rival not too far behind China, its number one strategic challenger. In cold, geopolitical terms, this war provides a prime opportunity for the US to erode and degrade Russia’s conventional defense capability, with no boots on the ground and little risk to US lives.

The Ukrainian armed forces have already killed or wounded upwards of 100,000 Russian troops, half its original fighting force; there have been almost 8,000 confirmed losses of armored vehicles including thousands of tanks, thousands of APCs, artillery pieces, hundreds of fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and numerous naval vessels. US spending of 5.6% of its defense budget to destroy nearly half of Russia’s conventional military capability seems like an absolutely incredible investment. If we divide out the US defense budget to the threats it faces, Russia would perhaps be of the order of $100bn-150bn in spend-to-threat. So spending just $40bn a year, erodes a threat value of $100-150bn, a two-to-three time return.  Actually the return is likely to be multiples of this given that defense spending, and threat are annual recurring events.

This simple point is important to keep in mind when considering the raucous debates that are expected to emerge surrounding this issue in the next Congress. There’s been a lot of conversation about how congressional Republicans might slash U.S. aid, given the votes by 57 House Republicans against the most recent Ukraine appropriations package, as well as Speaker-elect Kevin McCarthy’s insistence that aid to Ukraine “can’t be a blank check.”

But in light of the degree of support that exists for continuing to back Kyiv’s war effort, it is highly unlikely that, in the near term, Congress will significantly scale back U.S. support. Most lawmakers — including those who didn’t support the last appropriations package — recognize the point made in this CEPA analysis. Republicans concerned about the degree of U.S. support to Ukraine might demand that the U.S. cut economic aid to Kyiv, as this was a sticking point during the last vote. But even those who oppose that form of assistance have expressed support for continuing, even expanding, the effort to arm the Ukrainian military.

In June, the Republican Study Committee — the largest group of conservatives in the House — put forward a budget proposal that expressed support for doing just that, after its chairman, Representative Jim Banks, and other members voted against the Ukraine aid package this spring:

The RSC Budget would also help Ukraine defend itself and win the war by providing Ukraine with heavy artillery, armored vehicles, air defense systems, helicopters, javelin anti-tank missiles, harpoon anti-ship missiles, stinger anti-air missiles, as well as intelligence support, ammunition, and expedited shipments of military equipment to Ukraine. This budget would also backfill our European NATO allies such as Slovakia, which has provided the S-300 anti-air defense system to Ukraine, with U.S. replacements such as the Patriot missiles. In addition, this budget would provide combat aircraft to NATO countries and other partners willing to provide their combat aircraft to Ukraine.

Meanwhile, in an interview with CNN just ahead of Election Day this month, McCarthy expanded on his blank-check remark, suggesting that he meant that Republicans would subject aid to more robust oversight:

I’m very supportive of Ukraine. I think there has to be accountability going forward. . . . You always need, not a blank check, but make sure the resources are going to where it is needed. And make sure Congress, and the Senate, have the ability to debate it openly.

All of this would strongly suggest that heightened congressional oversight of Ukraine aid is wholly compatible with the belief that the U.S. investment in Kyiv’s war machine is an effective use of funds. There’s going to be a vibrant debate about the U.S. approach to Ukraine in the next Congress, and lawmakers might keep the point made in this CEPA analysis at the front of their minds.

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