Song Byeok is a defector, an escapee, from North Korea. For seven years, he worked as a propaganda artist for the regime. Now he uses his art to depict the reality of his native land. I met him at the Oslo Freedom Forum, where he had an exhibition. I talked with him about his life, and his work, and the country he left. What he has to say is . . . important, and urgent. For my piece “Depicting North Korea,” go here.
In a post, I wanted to say something about this word “defector.” I have always used it, when talking about people who managed to escape North Korea. Some readers have questioned me about it, and this question deserves an answer. In 2019, I wrote about Thae Yong-ho, a North Korean diplomat who defected. Everyone would call him a “defector.” But what about an ordinary person who gets to the Tumen River, swims it, reaches China, survives the Gobi Desert, and then gets to South Korea, and beyond?
The short answer is: I use the word “defector” because North Koreans do — all of them.
When you are born in North Korea, you are born, automatically, a soldier of the regime. You belong to the ruling Kim family body and soul. You exist to devote your life to them. There is no difference between your life and service to the ruling family. And if you leave — you have defected. You have betrayed the regime. You are disloyal.
You get the picture. (Not to be cutesy, but Song Byeok gives you literal pictures.)
Let me quote from my piece today. In the early 2000s,
I asked Jeane Kirkpatrick about U.S. policy toward North Korea. (Kirkpatrick was a distinguished political scientist who served as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations during President Reagan’s first term.) “North Korea is a psychotic state,” she said, “and the world has had very little experience of such states.” Plenty of dictatorships are evil — oppressive, murderous — without being psychotic.
And this regime, North Korea’s, has nuclear weapons.
Let me quote another conversation — one I had with Ash Carter in 2017. He was a theoretical physicist and defense expert, who worked in both government and academia. His governmental career began in the Reagan administration, and it ended in the Obama administration. From 2015 to 2017, he was secretary of defense.
Carter passed away in 2022. I wrote an appreciation of him, quoting extensively from our conversation five years before. Here is an excerpt from that appreciation:
Carter knew a lot — a lot — about nuclear weapons, and other matters nuclear. As of now, there are nine nuclear states — only nine. I regard this as astonishing, given that the relevant technology dates from the 1940s. There are almost 200 nations in the world. And only nine are nuclear? How did we get so lucky?
“It’s a miracle,” said Carter, “and one that we should not take for granted.” Any country, he said, is capable of making an A-bomb once it gets the materials. It doesn’t matter how backward the country is: Just look at North Korea.
We have to be ever vigilant, Carter emphasized. And U.S. leadership is critical. We have alliances with Germany, Japan, others — and they are not nuclear because we are. But if our leadership in the world sagged . . .
One can imagine a free-for-all.
When we talked of North Korea, Carter laid down three D’s (as I think of them): deterrence, defense, and diplomacy. You have to deter. But if that fails, you have to defend. You have to fight and win. What about diplomacy? That should be a “coercive” diplomacy, said Carter. More on that in a moment.
In the early years of the Obama administration — before he was deputy secretary and before he was secretary — Carter was the “weapons czar” (a colloquial title, obviously). In this time, he oversaw an increase in our missile defenses: an increase in their sophistication, an increase in their number. He took criticism for this, from people who said, “It’s not like a North Korean nuke can reach our shores.” Carter replied, “Maybe. But I’m paid to provide an insurance policy. What if, before long, a North Korean nuke can?”
Back to diplomacy (and a particular kind). People speak of “military options” and “diplomacy,” said Carter. They keep those things separate. But they should not. Military options and diplomacy, said Carter, ought to be “woven together into a coercive diplomacy, where you proceed step by step,” offering carrots and sticks. If you continue your missile tests, we will do X to you. If you discontinue them, we will reward you with Y.
When Carter talked in this vein, I thought of Frederick the Great: “Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments.” (Frederick was not only a vaunted military leader but also a musician, a flutist.)
Is Iran deterrable? That is, if Iran went nuclear, could we deter it? I have put this question to many people, including Bernard Lewis, the late Middle East scholar. No, said Lewis. To Iran’s rulers, mass destruction — the devastation of Iran — would be an inducement, not a deterrent. They are religious zealots.
What said Ash Carter? “Deterrence is a strong force, but not an infallible force.” Deterrence worked, he said, with Leonid Brezhnev’s Soviet Union, or appears to have worked. But the rulers of Iran? The rulers of North Korea? They are wild cards. When it comes to the Iranians, and other such actors, it is not wise to say, “Let them get nukes. It will be okay, because it will be like the Cold War, when everyone behaved.”
A final conversation, a final memory, please. Years ago, I talked with George F. Will about North Korea — specifically, about U.S. policy toward that insane, and deadly, country. He said something like this: We like to solve problems. We are “problem-solvers.” But there are problems in the world that can’t be solved. They have to be more like managed. We have to stumble through, somehow, until the threat has passed — if it passes. Until it passes, we have to keep managing, as best we can.
That is not ideal. But then, neither are foreign or human affairs.