The idea that Beijing shares the view of many Western policy-makers that climate change is some kind of existential threat is nonsense.
Well aware that China is making its promises about the feasibility of a green “transition” look ridiculous, Western climate policy-makers are always keen to stress the advances that China is making in renewable energy. That is to (deliberately) miss the point. The emphasis put by the Beijing regime on renewables is designed to achieve two things. The first is to take China closer to self-sufficiency, an aim it has across many sectors of the economy. The second is use China’s domestic market as a proving ground for the green technology that it sells to the West in pursuit of profit and geopolitical advantage.
The idea that Beijing shares the view of many Western policy-makers that climate change is some kind of existential threat is nonsense, as this recent story (which comes with an extra twist) ought to remind us.
Tom Sharpe, writing in the Daily Telegraph:
One of the great things about ignoring international law and violently snatching other people’s territory is that it pays off. Sometimes it pays off big.
China has now confirmed the discovery of the world’s first large, ultra-shallow gas field in ultra-deep waters. The gas is at an average burial depth of 210 metres but this is below a seabed that is an average of 1,500 metres deep. In accessing the Lingshui 36-1 gas field, China’s state-run National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has seemingly overcome the technical challenges inherent in reaching it.
The field is estimated to contain around 3.53 trillion cubic feet of gas, which Sharpe reckons might be worth $15bn. There is probably more around there to find. But where is “there”?
Beijing has been a little vague about that, saying, “It is in waters southeast of Hainan, China’s southernmost island province.”
Sharpe:
Southeast of Hainan, out in the South China Sea, lie the Paracel Islands. They are occupied by China but also claimed by both Vietnam and Taiwan. China was left in possession of the Paracels after it won a brief naval battle against South Vietnam in 1974, but the islands’ actual ownership remains hotly contested.
If the Paracels belong to someone other than China, China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) ends halfway towards them — and in that case, the Chinese EEZ covers only shallow waters, barely beyond the 200m contour. It’s all but a certainty that Lingshui 36-1 lies within the Paracels’ EEZ, and thus potentially within the Vietnamese or Taiwanese EEZ.
There are two questions (for now) about this. The first is whether China’s (supposed) concern about the climate will stop it from developing the field. The second is whether sensitivity about rival claims to the territory within which the field is located will stop China from developing the field.
The answer in both cases (in case there was any doubt about it) is no.