The Red Sea Needs a Big Blue Blanket

A U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Jason Dunham and Egyptian Navy frigate ENS Alexandria conduct maneuvering-operation exercises in the Red Sea, February 7, 2022. (U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. Navy Theoplis Stewart ll/Reuters)

The U.S. Navy must return to the principles of overwhelming force and proactive engagement that once defined its success.

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The U.S. Navy must return to the principles of overwhelming force and proactive engagement that once defined its success.

E ighty years ago this month, the Allies launched the liberation of the Philippines and fought history’s largest naval battle, Leyte Gulf. Today, as U.S. forces face mounting challenges in the Red Sea against Iran-backed Houthi rebels, the lessons from that pivotal battle are more relevant than ever. Just as in 1944, the U.S. Navy now confronts strategic maritime threats, but the difference lies in the hesitance of the United States to employ the overwhelming force and comprehensive strategy that once secured American dominance on the seas. As history shows, only decisive action can turn the tide.

In 1944, the ability of the U.S. Navy to achieve dominance rested on the foresight and decisiveness of its leaders. As General Douglas Macarthur landed American Army forces on the island of Leyte, Admiral William Halsey’s Third Fleet introduced a strategy, the “Big Blue Blanket,” that provided a powerful template for maritime dominance, particularly in the face of the threat of the Japanese kamikaze. This strategy involved overwhelming the enemy with air cover, surface ships, and submarines, creating a protective barrier for amphibious landings and protecting the critical sea lanes in the Pacific. It demonstrated how, when applied decisively and comprehensively, American naval power could turn the tide of a conflict.

The Big Blue Blanket was a comprehensive defensive strategy devised by Captain John Thach. Thach was a U.S. Navy aviator and tactician during World War II, renowned for creating the “Thach Weave” tactic to counter Japanese Mitsubishi A6M “Zero” fighters, and was on the staff of Vice Admiral John S. McCain Sr. (grandfather of the late senator John McCain), commander of Task Force 38. Designed to neutralize the kamikaze threat, the strategy involved creating an impenetrable shield over U.S. forces and supply lines, using a coordinated combination of fighter aircraft, antiaircraft ships, and radar-equipped vessels. By maintaining constant aerial patrols and employing radar-picket ships, the Navy aimed to intercept and destroy Japanese kamikazes before they could reach their targets. The effectiveness of the Big Blue Blanket lay in its layered defense, whereby early warning systems provided detection while fighters and antiaircraft guns formed the next barrier. This allowed the U.S. fleet to withstand the relentless kamikaze attacks, securing crucial sea lanes and supporting the successful amphibious landings in the Philippines.

The liberation of the Philippines and the Battle of Leyte Gulf marked the first time the United States Navy encountered widespread, organized kamikaze attacks. These suicide missions, flown by Japanese pilots in aircraft loaded with explosives, were designed to inflict maximum damage by crashing into Allied ships. The kamikaze pilots’ singular objective enabled them to extend their usual range, nearly doubling it, as they no longer needed to conserve fuel for a return trip. This enabled them to reach targets that otherwise would have been out of range. During the Battle of Leyte Gulf and subsequent operations, the U.S. Navy was confronted with waves of such attacks, which challenged the fleet’s defensive capabilities. In response, the Navy implemented countermeasures such as the Big Blue Blanket to mitigate the threat. Still, the psychological and material toll of the kamikaze offensive was significant, foreshadowing the desperate intensity of Japan’s final war efforts.

The U.S. Navy today faces a similarly asymmetric and persistent enemy in the form of Iran-backed Houthi rebels. The modern adversary employs drones and missiles instead of suicide planes, challenging the U.S. to defend key maritime choke points. The Houthis, a rebel group originating in northern Yemen and consist primarily of Zaidi Shia Muslims, have been involved in Yemen’s civil war since 2014. Backed by Iran, they have gained control of significant parts of the country, including the capital, Sanaa, and disrupted shipping in the Red Sea.

Despite technological advancements, the fundamental challenge remains: defending critical sea lanes from persistent aerial threats. Although modern technology has evolved, the current air-and-sea combat situation in the Red Sea mirrors the challenges faced during the liberation of the Philippines in 1944, when naval forces had to contend with persistent aerial threats and defend critical sea lanes. The Houthis have launched a series of dispersed attacks on commercial shipping, using drones and missiles to control key waterways including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait — one of the most critical maritime choke points in the world, connecting the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. Despite the U.S. response through Operation Prosperity Guardian, which includes air strikes and naval escorts, the results have been far from decisive. The Houthis continue to disrupt shipping, and the U.S. seems bogged down in a tit-for-tat campaign, unable to replicate the comprehensive dominance seen in the past.

In a May 2024 report from the Heritage Foundation, Brent Sadler and Nicole Robinson highlight a critical shift in U.S. military strategy, which today contrasts sharply with the comprehensive and overwhelming approach that defined past successes such as the Big Blue Blanket. Sadler and Robinson argue that the Biden administration’s strategy in the Middle East, particularly in the Red Sea, has been marked by insufficient force and a piecemeal response to the Iranian-backed Houthi attacks on global shipping. That approach is reactive and limited, the authors suggest, as it fails to decisively neutralize the threat or secure vital waterways. The reluctance of the U.S. Navy to deploy overwhelming force today as it did in the Pacific 80 years ago stems from political caution, military overstretch, and the complex entanglement of interests in regions including Iran, Russia, and China. Without a return to overwhelming and decisive action, as seen in the Navy’s proud history, the U.S. risks further erosion of its maritime supremacy and global influence​.

The principles behind the Big Blue Blanket — comprehensive coverage, layered defense, and overwhelming force — entail the application of superior military power and resources in such a way that the opposition is outmatched and defeated in swift and decisive fashion, its ability to inflict damage minimized. Contrast that with the reactive, limited engagement seen today in the Red Sea. The lack of decisive strategy leaves U.S. forces on the back foot as they respond piecemeal to a more agile, asymmetric adversary. The Navy’s reliance on a defensive posture against Houthi missile and drone strikes reflects a broader strategic hesitation, as concerns about escalation with Iran and the involvement of Russian and Chinese interests complicate the response. Yet these concerns, albeit weighty, should not dictate a purely reactive stance. The U.S. must balance caution and decisive action or be forced to police the Red Sea in perpetuity.

Moreover, the Red Sea situation highlights a broader erosion of maritime norms. Smaller actors such as the Houthis are allowed to challenge global shipping routes with relatively low-cost technologies. Open trade depends on protected trade routes, as the free movement of goods across borders requires the security of key maritime and overland pathways to prevent disruptions from piracy, terrorism, or geopolitical conflicts that could undermine global commerce. This reflects a stark contrast to the dominance achieved by U.S. forces in the Pacific in 1944 when the Navy leveraged fast carrier task forces and technological advantages to secure the sea lanes.

The U.S. Navy must return to the principles of overwhelming force and proactive engagement that once defined its success. Without such a shift, American naval dominance will continue to erode and global commerce will remain vulnerable to asymmetric threats like those posed by the Houthis. The stakes are high, and only decisive action will prevent further degradation of U.S. influence on the seas.

Donald Bryson is the CEO of the John Locke Foundation, a free-market think tank in Raleigh, N.C.
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