America’s Enemies Would Rejoice at a U.S. Military Retreat from Europe

L ast month, Vladimir Putin seemingly unveiled changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine — the conditions in which Moscow would employ such a weapon — that sent a clear message to the West: Even if the war in Ukraine stops, Russia’s threats of war will not. Sowing discord between the U.S. and its allies in Europe remains a central goal of these threats, and it is the responsibility of American leaders to avoid playing into Putin’s hands. America’s adversaries in the emerging Axis of Aggression (Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea) dream of a U.S. retreat from global engagement. Authoritarians despise how U.S. forces stationed abroad, in Europe and beyond, reassure key allies and communicate our will to protect our partners. As Putin attempts to fracture transatlantic relations through nuclear threats, Washington must never lose sight of the fundamental political role that U.S. conventional forces play in maintaining the NATO alliance.

Whether Putin’s rhetoric represents a meaningful long-term change or simply more saber-rattling will remain uncertain until an official policy document is released. But some analysts warn that the Kremlin boss suggested a lower threshold for the Russian use of nuclear weapons — both to hold non-nuclear states like Ukraine responsible for conventional attacks and to punish third parties like the United States for aiding Kyiv.

Other Kremlin watchers believe Putin’s remarks are a symptom of what security analyst Dima Adamsky calls Russia’s “new normal”: the brandishing of nuclear weapons to weaken Western resolve and sow divisions within NATO. The erosion of Russia’s nuclear taboo is playing out on a societal level, where government officials and state-run media aim to desensitize the Russian people to the idea of nuclear warfare in ways unthinkable to Westerners. The United States should thus assume that Putin’s incessant threat-making will remain a central feature of Russian statecraft even after the Ukraine war ends.

As U.S. officials assess how to adjust the nation’s global military posture for long-term competition with the Axis of Aggression, they should factor Russia’s new nuclear normal into the equation. It is undeniable that Washington must devote a larger share of defense resources to deterring China as Beijing’s own capabilities grow. And NATO allies like Germany and France should shoulder more of the defense burden in Europe as Washington prioritizes the Asia-Pacific. Yet only focusing on military-technical considerations at the expense of more subtle political factors risks giving Putin’s nuclear bullying the chance to weaken, if not sever, trans-Atlantic ties. There are no shortcuts to reassuring our European allies and keeping them enlisted in the broader struggle against China and the Axis of Aggression.

Recently, however, several policy frameworks have been proposed that overlook the political significance of forward-deployed U.S. conventional forces. These proposals insist Europe must contribute “most if not all of the conventional forces necessary to deter” Russia. They suggest that transferring the bulk of U.S. combat power to Asia would incentivize Germany and France to pick up the slack, so to speak, on the Continent. Washington’s contribution to the Atlantic alliance would thus rest primarily on its extended nuclear deterrent — allowing it to prioritize China and divest from Europe.

Defense experts close to former president Donald J. Trump’s advisory circle have also proposed dramatic cuts to America’s forward-deployed conventional posture in Europe. Many believe Washington will have to leave Europe more exposed to free up resources for the Asia-Pacific. Others have even called for a radical reorientation of NATO, in which the United States contributes only enough ground forces to serve as a last-ditch logistics provider. All downplay or ignore the fact that the United States is the glue binding NATO together.

Between proposals like these and Putin’s unceasing nuclear threats, it is little wonder that Europe is increasingly anxious about U.S. security guarantees. Our NATO allies — especially frontline partners like Poland and the Baltics who already carry their share of the defense burden — would likely consider any effort to consign the U.S. to extended nuclear deterrence as abandoning existing security commitments. After all, if Washington is unwilling to devote meaningful conventional firepower to Europe in the name of resource scarcity, why would it take steps — like using nuclear weapons — that risk a catastrophic war that diverts attention from Asia? Why would Washington not simply husband its resources, as suggested, and leave Eastern Europe to its own devices?

Cold War history suggests that relying on token conventional contributions would have dire consequences. In the mid 1970s, as Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield sought to downsize U.S. forces in Europe following the Vietnam War, West German officials expressed grave concern about the Soviet tanks massed on their border. They believed Washington’s forward-deployed conventional capability tied the U.S. nuclear arsenal to NATO. Thus, to reassure an anxious ally in the midst of Mansfield’s ill-advised campaign, the Gerald Ford administration parked two additional U.S. combat brigades on the German lowlands. And despite Washington’s dissatisfaction with the German defense program in the years ahead — in 1984, for example, a former U.S. defense secretary delivered a blistering critique of Bonn — those brigades remained in Europe.

Fortunately for the United States today, frontline allies like Poland and the Baltics are doing their fair share and continue to ramp up defense spending. It would be a grievous, unforced error to jeopardize NATO’s future — and, more importantly, the American national interest — by ignoring the political import of forward-deployed capability because of the fitful German and French defense effort. European capitals are already worried that fraying trans-Atlantic trade ties over two successive U.S. administrations, combined with a broad American withdrawal from the Continent, could invigorate efforts to bring European defense capabilities under the EU umbrella in ways that damage NATO cohesion.

Hasty and deep reductions to U.S. combat capability in Europe would alienate Washington’s most valuable economic and political partners and reduce their incentive to maintain a united front against China. As A. Wess Mitchell and Jakub Grygiel point out, Europe is indispensable to the U.S. global position. Its economic heft, geostrategic importance, role in underwriting America’s global reputation, and political and cultural ties to the United States are irreplaceable and unique in their convergence.

While fair critiques can be leveled at European governments for their hesitation on important strategic issues, our European allies have often helped us manage a range of security challenges. From restricting Chinese access to advanced chipmaking technology, to assisting with U.S. efforts to defend Israel from Iranian attack, to providing essential aid to Ukraine even as Washington dithered, our European allies have benefited our global interests.

But European NATO’s main contribution to the United States is in Europe itself, specifically in maintaining a modicum of stability on the Continent. A dramatic conventional drawdown of U.S. forces would diminish America’s influence in Europe — the critical ingredient lending NATO its strategic coherence. Even if Eastern Europe remained onside against Russia after an American drawdown, Western Europe would still be at a fraught juncture where political forces sympathetic to NATO lack the political capital to fill the void as they juggle a raft of competing capital-intensive priorities. In addition, a trans-Atlantic unraveling would give little incentive for Europe to cooperate with the United States in countering China’s global reach, leaving Washington worse off in the Asia-Pacific.

The central role of the United States in maintaining the trans-Atlantic alliance makes clear there are no shortcuts to countering Putin’s nuclear bullying and China’s global reach. If Washington desires an international environment conducive to American freedom and prosperity, U.S. officials must recognize the political role of forward-deployed conventional forces. To ignore this reality would be to jeopardize an alliance critical to competing against the new Axis of Aggression.

Kyle Balzer is a Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Wes Culp is a research associate at the American Enterprise Institute.