China and Russia are actively exploiting our internal chaos to reshape the global order in their favor.
China and Russia are actively exploiting our internal chaos to reshape the global order in their favor.
A s the world watches the unfolding geopolitical chess match, it’s increasingly clear that the Axis of Aggression — the unofficial alliance of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea against the U.S. — harbors more than just ambitions of regional dominance. Its strategies extend beyond military posturing and economic influence; they also involve a keen interest in America’s internal dysfunctions. Specifically, our autocratic rivals benefit from, and increasingly stoke, three dysfunctions that have overtaken American politics: budgetary instability, industrial stagnation, and fractured alliances.
One of the cornerstones of America’s global influence is its economic might. For as long as “guns vs. butter” has been a philosophical debate, America has dominated due to its ability to fund both. But today, we are for the first time ever spending more on debt-interest payments than on national defense, causing many to question whether “guns” need to be cut to create space for “butter.”
If that was not bad enough, our political dysfunction has gridlocked our budgetary processes, which are now marked by government shutdowns, continuing resolutions, brinksmanship about defaulting on national-debt payments, and partisan deadlocks over spending caps. Combined, all of these undermine not just our military might, but also our geostrategic influence. The “peace dividend” of the 1990s, the sequestration of the 2010s, and the Fiscal Responsibility Act of the 2020s have all contributed to a hollowing out of the military which today is operating around the globe undermanned, and lacks sufficient munitions for a long, large-scale war. Due to fiscal constraints, we have destroyed more of our military capability than any adversary could.
America’s budgetary woes provide an opportunity for China to present itself as a more stable economic partner, particularly to developing nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative is designed to exploit this opportunity, offering infrastructure investment and financial aid that appear more reliable than the erratic policies emerging from Washington. China has followed the American playbook of the 20th century to emphasize “butter” in addition to “guns” in its foreign policy.
Our budgetary dysfunction also benefits the Kremlin, though in a slightly different way. Russia, an economic basket case itself, has made the strategic bet that it can fiscally outlast the United States in Ukraine. War is a national endeavor and the Russians have gone “all in” on guns, at the expense of butter. Moscow is looking to capitalize on the fact that some in the United States believe that defending against Russian aggression in Europe is too expensive.
The second dysfunction is American industrial stagnation, particularly in critical sectors like mining, technology, and manufacturing. In some cases, this has been caused by political decisions which led entire sectors to migrate offshore. For example, regulations made mining in the United States unprofitable. In other cases, it is our own defense bureaucracy that refuses to rapidly integrate world-leading technology from the private sector into defense weapons and munitions.
China, with its state-directed economy, has made no secret of its ambition to surpass the U.S. in key technologies, including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and 5G communications. American political dysfunction, particularly the inability to agree on long-term investments in science and technology, plays directly into Chinese hands. China also has not made a secret of the fact that all of its commercial technology exists to serve its national-security aims, and therefore has made incredible leaps over the past two decades in modernizing its military.
Russia, though less of a technological powerhouse, still benefits from American industrial malaise. Moscow has long relied on asymmetric strategies, such as cyber-warfare and disinformation campaigns, to undermine U.S. dominance. But Russia has also been able to more effectively mobilize its economy in the service of its war in Ukraine than the Europe or the United States have been able to mobilize theirs in the service of stopping it.
Perhaps the most significant dysfunction that China and Russia desire is the fracturing of America’s global alliances. The U.S. has traditionally relied on a network of alliances to project power and maintain global order, but these relationships are increasingly strained by discord within the United States. Within the United States, this discord manifests itself in two ways: on one side is a growing isolationism under the pretenses of American prioritization, while on the other side is a movement mobilizing to limit America’s ability to cause harm on the global stage.
China’s strategy here is twofold. First, Beijing seeks to exploit divisions within American alliances, such as NATO or the U.S.-Japan-South Korea triangle, by offering alternative partnerships that seem less demanding or more lucrative. For example, China’s economic leverage over countries in the European Union has led to splits within NATO on issues like Huawei and 5G infrastructure. Second, China uses American political dysfunction to portray the U.S. as an unreliable partner. This narrative is particularly powerful in Southeast Asia, where nations are wary of becoming pawns in the U.S.-China rivalry.
Russia’s interest in fractured U.S. alliances is even more direct. The Kremlin has long sought to weaken NATO, which it sees as the primary obstacle to its ambitions in Eastern Europe. U.S. political dysfunction, particularly when it leads to erratic foreign-policy decisions, sows doubt among European allies about America’s commitment to Europe’s collective defense. This doubt was on full display during recent debates over defense spending and U.S. military deployments in Europe. When allies question whether the U.S. will follow through on its commitments, Russia sees an opportunity to divide and conquer.
The dysfunctions in American politics — budgetary instability, industrial stagnation, and fractured alliances — are not just domestic issues. They are vulnerabilities that China and Russia are actively exploiting to reshape the global order in their favor. Addressing these dysfunctions is not merely a matter of domestic policy; it is a strategic imperative.
To counter these threats, the United States must restore the primacy of national defense in its budgetary process, conquer its own bureaucracy to enable the technological might of the nation to be harnessed for military use, and reaffirm its commitment to global alliances.
This will require political leaders willing to look beyond short-term partisan gains and focus on the long-term strategic interests of the nation. The stakes could not be higher. If America fails to address these dysfunctions, it risks ceding the 21st century to authoritarian powers that have no interest in preserving the liberal order that has underpinned global peace and prosperity for decades.