By refusing to acknowledge Israel’s legitimate security concerns, Egypt is undermining its own interests.
By refusing to acknowledge Israel’s legitimate security concerns, Egypt is undermining its own interests.
T he Philadelphi Corridor remains a key source of tension in current Israel–Hamas cease-fire negotiations. Israel insists that it must retain control of the territory, a narrow strip of land that runs along the Egypt–Gaza border, to prevent Hamas from smuggling arms into Gaza from the Sinai. Cairo, however, argues that an Israeli presence in the corridor constitutes an unacceptable challenge to its leadership role in the region. But Egyptian leaders have only themselves to blame for Israel’s demand. In fact, it was Cairo that precipitated the war by allowing Hamas to smuggle matériel into Gaza for years.
Despite significant resistance from Egyptian officials, Israeli forces took control of the Philadelphi Corridor on May 7, aiming to cut off Hamas’s arms-smuggling routes in the tunnels beneath it. The move spurred outrage in Egypt. On May 10, prominent Egyptian talk-show host Amr Adeeb spoke for the government and millions of Egyptians when he publicly condemned the Israeli action. The move was “full of challenge and stupidity,” he said on his show. State-sponsored Egyptian media echoed this refrain.
Historically, Egypt has served as Israel’s gatekeeper to the Arab world. It led forces against Israel during its War of Independence and later clashed with Israel in the 1956 war. The rivalry deepened with Egypt’s involvement in the Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. These conflicts bolstered Egypt’s image as the defender of Arab interests and the leader of the Palestinian cause. After Egypt made peace with Israel in 1979, the relationship remained cold, as Egyptian society never fully embraced the peace deal.
In recent years, however, Egypt’s role has shifted dramatically. The 2020 Abraham Accords, as well as efforts to expand them to other Arab nations, effectively sidelined Cairo as Gulf countries such as the United Arab Emirates assumed greater prominence in managing Arab–Israeli ties.
In a further blow to Cairo’s self-image, Egypt has had to rely on Israel for intelligence and joint military operations aimed at combating the Islamic State in the Sinai. Cairo has even allowed Israel to strike the terrorist group by air.
Egypt’s waning authority is apparent within its traditional spheres of influence as well. In the civil war afflicting Sudan, a neighboring country spanning Egypt’s longest border, Cairo has struggled to play a leadership role in stemming the conflict. Notably, Egypt is not even a part of the four-member group of countries overseeing the U.N.‑approved process for a political settlement. Instead, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have taken the lead.
Meanwhile, Egypt is grappling with a host of other problems that threaten the country’s stability. Most notably, economic volatility marked by record-high inflation, unemployment, and the increase of prices on highly subsidized commodities, including bread and electricity, has left Egyptians frustrated. Egypt has become dependent on foreign aid, global financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and the support of partner countries.
In the context of these developments, the border dispute in Gaza threatens to deepen the perception of Egyptian weakness both at home and abroad.
Despite Cairo’s past commitments to its U.S. and Israeli partners to secure the border, Egypt’s stance on the issue has often been contradictory. On the one hand, it has acknowledged the smuggling operations and described them as a problem. On the other hand, it has failed to stop them. In the most egregious cases, Egyptian border guards and high-ranking officials have allegedly colluded with Hamas by accepting bribes to allow weapons and other goods to pass through the tunnels.
In May, the Israeli military’s chief spokesperson, Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, declared that the “Philadelphi Corridor served as the oxygen line of Hamas through which Hamas carried out weapons smuggling into Gaza on a regular basis.” In the days immediately after their takeover of the corridor, Israeli forces discovered some 20 tunnels and 82 access points to them. On August 4, Israeli forces uncovered an unusually large, ten-foot-high tunnel. According to photos provided by Israel, it was located within view of Egyptian guard towers and the border fence.
The problem is not new. As far back as 2006, Yuval Diskin, then director of the Shin Bet, said, “The Egyptians know who the smugglers are and don’t deal with them. . . . They received intelligence on this from us and didn’t use it.” In 2007, the New York Times reported that Israeli officials had sent videotapes to U.S. officials showing Egyptian border guards aiding the smuggling. This history raises questions about whether Egypt’s actions — or lack thereof — reflect incompetence or a deliberate policy.
Ultimately, this moment presents an opportunity for the United States to hold Egypt’s feet to the fire.
To press Cairo, the United States should consider conditioning future aid on Cairo’s willingness to cooperate. This should include a demand for greater transparency and independent oversight to verify Egyptian claims about the tunnels. Congress ought to hold hearings to better understand Egypt’s role and its compliance as a U.S. ally. Despite Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s nine trips to the Middle East since the start of the war, there has been little clarity on how Egypt intends to fulfill its role as a mediator.
By refusing to acknowledge Israel’s legitimate security concerns, Egypt is undermining its own interests, prolonging the war in Gaza, and further destabilizing its relationship with Jerusalem. It is time for Egyptian leaders to either admit their inability to secure the border and seek help from Israel and America, or risk being perceived as enablers of Hamas and its terrorist campaign.