The Ukrainian Invasion of Russia Is a Game-Changer

P repared in total secrecy, Ukraine’s offensive into Russia’s Kursk and Belgorod regions has taken the Kremlin and official Washington by surprise. Ukrainian sources indicate the attack was launched without consultation with the U.S. and other allies, making it an important reminder that Ukraine is a sovereign state capable of making its own strategic and tactical decisions in the all-out war.

Now well into its second week, the offensive has marched twelve miles into Russian territory bordering northeastern Ukraine. According to General Oleksandr Syrsky, the commander in chief of Ukraine’s armed forces, the Ukrainians now control some 600 square miles of territory and over 70 towns and settlements in mainly rural regions inside Russia. Russia itself has announced plans for the evacuation of nearly 200,000 citizens in the region. Social-media platforms are replete with photos and videos of hundreds of Russian prisoners of war, including over 100 taken on August 13.

Ukraine’s offensive, the first time it has launched a military invasion on Russian territory, is far more than a tactical operation. In many ways, it is a game-changer.

First, it expands the front Russia has to defend, exposing weaknesses in Russian defenses. Ukraine and Russia share over 1,800 miles of borders, but only a third heretofore was a zone of direct conflict.

Second, it reduces the chances of Russian advances into Ukraine’s northeastern regions of Kharkiv and Sumy. By driving forces further away from these regions, it creates a buffer zone that reduces the frequency and intensity of attacks on populous Ukrainian regions.

Third, it is likely to require the major redeployments of Russian forces from southern Ukraine and the Donbas, reducing the chances of Russian territorial gains and opening the door to potential Ukrainian counterattacks.

Fourth, it strikes at the heart of the myth of Russian military strength — largely debunked by Ukraine’s two and a half years of heroic resistance, but still widely shared by the Russian people. Indeed, Putin’s subdued rhetoric in the face of the first incursion of foreign forces into European Russia since World War II suggests that he is well aware of the limits of his conventional military power.

Fifth, it has demolished the persistent myth of Russian escalation dominance, a concept that once drove the Obama administration to refuse to arm Ukraine at all after Russia launched its war in 2014. The persistence of this Obama-era doctrine — including its unjustified fear of a Russian nuclear response — has contributed to the Biden administration’s heavy restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range U.S. weapons and missiles against Russia.

Sixth, it has given the morale of Ukraine’s armed forces a huge boost, while at the same time signaling to the Russian people — and to the Russian elite — that the Kremlin’s promised quick victory has turned into a debilitating and dangerous quagmire.

Perhaps best of all, the daring Kursk offensive demonstrates that when the Ukrainian military is given adequate funding, guarantees that the supply of weapons will flow without interruption, and the freedom to establish its own tactics and priorities, Ukraine can win. Ukraine’s bold maneuver is not only aimed at changing the military calculus on the ground; it is intended to break the torpor that has characterized U.S. and European strategic thinking about the conduct of the war. The well-worn, mistaken consensus that a de facto stalemate coupled with mildly effective sanctions will force Putin to the negotiating table is now even more discredited than it was before. Ukraine is now arguing that a real negotiation will only occur if Ukraine is taking the battle to Russia.

In November 2023, three Republican House leaders — Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Michael McCaul, Armed Services Committee chairman Mike Rogers, and Intelligence Committee chairman Mike Turner — published a “Plan for Victory in Ukraine.” Their important proposal offered a three-pronged strategy to defeat Putin’s Russia: “1) providing critical weapons to Ukraine at the speed of relevance; 2) tightening sanctions on the Putin regime; and 3) transferring [the over $300 billion in] frozen Russian sovereign assets” to the Ukrainian military effort.

The success of the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk should be an occasion for renewing the discussion of how to urgently and quickly help Ukraine build on its recent battlefield successes. By rapidly deploying and expanding U.S. and allied support at this critical moment, the West could help Ukraine in forcing Putin to reverse course, giving Kyiv strong bargaining power in any future cease-fire or peace negotiations.