It’s a Mistake for the U.S. to Leave Niger

A fter “difficult” negotiations, the U.S. and the government of Niger have agreed to a complete withdrawal, by mid September, of U.S. military personnel from bases in Niger. Since the military coup last July, which ousted President Mohamed Bazoum, relations between the U.S. and Niger’s military junta have steadily worsened. To that extent, at least, the recent announcement provided reassurance that our personnel would not simply be summarily ejected. 

Some would have it that our departure from Niger is of little moment. A case for this proposition was made in late March here at National Review by Daniel DePetris. DePetris correctly noted that the purpose of our military presence in Niger was to “monitor” terrorist activity across the Sahel region of West Africa and concedes that this is a growing problem in West Africa. He observes that “one can reasonably expect to see more terrorist activity in Niger with less U.S. eyes in the sky,” noting, again correctly, that the Islamic State and al-Qaeda now view the region as their “main base of operations.” Finally, there is the acknowledgement that Russia and China, already well-represented across Africa, will likely take advantage of the opening provided by the U.S. departure.

He then dismisses each of the foregoing concerns. Chinese investment, while substantial, has disappointed African governments. Closer ties with Russia might endanger relations with the West, and all Russia really has to offer are the services of “mercenary thugs” who protect “highly unpopular heads of state.” Finally, he reassures us that the Biden administration has already thought “this entire situation through,” having opened talks with the coastal states of Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Benin regarding hosting alternative locations for U.S. drone operations.

The very notion that the Biden administration has “thought” any foreign policy situation “through” should give us pause. So, too, with each of the foregoing arguments, which either ignore or minimize other critical considerations. DePetris dismisses the rising terrorist activity across the Sahel as largely aimed at the governments of the region and, therefore, inconsequential for the U.S. But these local governments are demonstrably incapable of dealing with this terrorist activity without our assistance. We’ve been down this path before. After all, we went into Afghanistan after 9/11 precisely because it was intolerable to leave terrorist movements to grow unmolested, to enjoy a “safe haven,” to move beyond simply being “local” threats.

Both the Islamic State and al-Qaeda remain irredeemably hostile to the “great Satan” and, left to build out their African sanctuaries, may once again become a threat to the U.S. Iran has also become a more significant player across Africa. Moreover, the mullahs have demonstrated repeatedly that, when it comes to discomfiting the U.S., they’re remarkably ecumenical when it comes to the Sunni versus Shiite divide and may well have an interest in working with these groups.

DePetris suggests that China has overplayed its economic hand in Africa, but the Chinese presence remains significant, particularly wherever critical natural resources are in play. But to focus simply on the economic dimension is to ignore the larger pattern of Chinese influence operations. The Chinese threat cannot be reduced to concerns about the Taiwan Strait. There is an important Chinese military base on the Horn of Africa in Djibouti. China is now well along in developing a similar military presence on the South Atlantic coast, in Equatorial Guinea. The Chinese have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to fill the voids we leave behind. China has significantly increased its influence in Africa over the last 20 years while, in the words of Thomas Sheehy, an African expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace, U.S. influence has “flatlined.”

Putin, of course, had a golden opportunity to rein in the presence of Russian mercenary thugs in Africa in the aftermath of the Prigozhin “can we call it a coup?” attempt. Instead, he doubled down, taking tighter control of these African assets but pushing their availability more widely than ever. One may wish, idealistically, that aligning Russia with African dictatorships may eventually prove costly and that time is on the side of democratic forces across the continent. But that requires playing a very long game, one measured in decades, and maybe not even then.

As for relocating our drone operations, one should simply look at the map. Our current base at Agadez is located in the center of Niger, which means that it is also located in the strategic center of the whole of western Africa. Drone coverage is not simply a function of range but also loiter time, which is maximized from a central location. Moving to a coastal region represents a poor tradeoff. Not incidentally, a presence in the Agadez region also offered an opportunity to influence, positively, the growing tide of illegal immigration flowing toward Europe and, increasingly, the southern border of the United States.

What, then, do we stand to lose? Unlike the French, tainted with colonial misdeeds and Macron’s ham-handed African diplomacy, we enjoyed a reasonable basis for good relations with the military in Niger. As some have noted, sniffily, several of the key leaders of the new junta had trained in the U.S. Perhaps, between now and September, we still find a modus vivendi. Niger’s leaders have left that door at least slightly ajar.

Against the myriad threats we currently face around the globe, maintaining a small base in Niger seems hardly significant. But the resources involved were small and the benefits many. Maintaining a visible presence and demonstrating staying power — these are important parts of ensuring our ability to shape events in our favor. One may dismiss the concept of “presence” as an outmoded relic, gunboat diplomacy redolent of Steve McQueen in The Sand Pebbles. But the old gunboats — or an ultramodern drone base — provided benefits all out of proportion to their size. We might ponder that going forward.