The Link between Age and Conservatism Is Breaking

M ichael Oakeshott understood that conservatism changes with the times. It finds different expressions, depending on where we find ourselves:

If the present is arid, offering little or nothing to be used or enjoyed, then this inclination will be weak or absent; if the present is remarkably unsettled, it will display itself in a search for a firmer foothold and consequently in a recourse to and an exploration of the past; but it asserts itself characteristically when there is much to be enjoyed, and it will be strongest when this is combined with evident risk of loss. In short, it is a disposition appropriate to a man who is acutely aware of having something to lose which he has learned to care for; a man in some degree rich in opportunities for enjoyment, but not so rich that he can afford to be indifferent to loss. It will appear more naturally in the old than in the young, not because the old are more sensitive to loss but because they are apt to be more fully aware of the resources of their world and therefore less likely to find them inadequate.

Oakeshott is correct that older people tend to be more conservative than the young. But his words offer several cautions, and they raise an uncomfortable question: Has the American way of life become anti-conservative?

Most polls show that Millennials and Gen Z are not becoming more conservative as they age, the way that Boomers and Gen X did before them.

Do they find the present arid, with little to be enjoyed? Maybe. We find shocking levels of reported depression and suicidality among the young, although in some ways, younger people have been groomed to report themselves as depressed and mentally unstable.

Conservatism is also associated with settling down. People who acquire property tend to become more conservative And Millennials just aren’t doing that at the same rates as previous generations. By age 30, just 42 percent of Millennials own homes compared to 48 percent of Gen Xers and 51 percent of Baby Boomers. The gap persists into their early 40s.

This is also a consequence of a marriage dearth among Millennials. Just three in ten Millennials live with a spouse and child. Gen Xers had achieved a rate of four in ten by a comparable age. Boomers were at 46 percent, and the Silent Generation at 70 percent when they were the same age as Millennials are now.

If current trends continue, perhaps 25 to 35 percent of Millennials will never marry. Unmarried men in middle age tend to drop out of the workforce and disappear into anti-social patterns of living. Unmarried women in middle age report huge rates of depression, or other mysterious illnesses that are diagnosed as fibromyalgia and rheumatoid arthritis, and are experienced as “constant pain” in all joints, poor sleep, and exhaustion.

The trends of atomization continue to accelerate. Each generation is less religiously affiliated than the previous ones and is less likely to be a member of a religious congregation. Each generation has weaker habits of civic association generally — meaning they invest less of their time and energy in in-person groups dedicated to bettering their community or providing a service. Millennial civic engagement is being redefined as online activism — starting GoFundMe’s and even sharing pre-fab emojis made by nongovernmental organizations.

Are we surprised that a generation that feels least optimistic about living in a family and in their own home has little faith in the American dream? Should we really find it shocking that so many of them find something resonant in the 1619 Project’s understanding of this country, which theorizes that America is about exploiting labor unjustly without due rewards or respect?

If we want the young to be conservative — if we want the Republican Party to remain conservative — perhaps we need to make sure that more young people grow up “having something to lose which they have learned to care for.”