The U.S. and China are evenly matched in their relations with Hanoi. It matters a lot who comes out ahead.
The two powers are evenly matched in their relations with Hanoi. It matters a lot who comes out ahead.
T he leaders of the United States and China visited Vietnam within three months of each other (September 11 and December 12, respectively), indicating a geopolitical competition in which Vietnam is becoming the focal point of a “love triangle.” Both the United States and China have launched diplomatic offensives. In assessing their gains and losses in the political, economic, and regional-security realms, I believe the current score is tied at 1.5 each.
Political Relations: China 1 point, U.S. 0 points
Both China and Vietnam are one-party authoritarian states with a common ideological foundation. Shortly before his visit to Vietnam on December 12, Xi Jinping wrote in an article in Nguoi Viet Daily News (Vietnamese People’s Daily) that he was about to visit the “socialist” Republic of Vietnam. He stressed the shared ideals and destiny of China and Vietnam, citing the historical comradeship and brotherhood between leaders such as Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh. “In the cause of socialist construction, we have learned from each other, expanded cooperation, and together written a chapter of friendly history between China and Vietnam,” Xi wrote. Throughout the visit, Xi stressed the need for China and Vietnam to work together on the socialist path.
While his use of the word “socialism” may be merely rhetorical, both ruling parties, and especially their leaders, share similar anxieties about the legitimacy of their political power. (It is worth noting that Nguyen Phu Trong, the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, also broke with tradition to assume power for a third term.) During Xi’s visit, China and Vietnam signed 36 agreements, the first four of which focus on ideological and political security cooperation. The agreements emphasize an exchange about experience in party and state governance, a deepening of the understanding of the laws of Communist Party rule, socialist construction, and the development of human society. Both parties give priority to safeguarding political security to ensure the lasting dominance of the socialist regime.
Preventing color revolutions is a shared imperative for both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). Their consistent consensus is that “the imperialist heart of the United States will never cease to harbor ill intentions against us.” They see the United States the likely source of possible color revolutions and regime changes in China and Vietnam and therefore as a fundamental enemy. In its drive to stay in power, each regime often uses nationalist sentiment directed against the U.S.
Indeed, as a leader in promoting liberal democratic values and the post–World War II rules-based international order, the United States cannot completely abandon efforts to promote human rights and political openness in its relations with China and Vietnam. Democratization, particularly an end to one-party rule in these two countries, aligns with long-term U.S. interests. In the political arena, therefore, the United States cannot gain the trust of the CPV and is even perceived as an ideological adversary.
Economic Relations: U.S. 0.5 points, China: 0.5 points
Economic performance is crucial to the CPV’s legitimacy, as it is to the CCP’s, and China, a neighbor and the world’s second-largest economy, is of great economic importance to Vietnam. In recent years, Sino–Vietnamese economic and trade relations have expanded rapidly, with bilateral trade increasing from $2.4 billion in 2000 to $234.9 billion in 2022. China has been Vietnam’s largest trading partner for years, and Vietnam is China’s largest trading partner in ASEAN and its fourth-largest in the world. Xi’s visit has further strengthened economic and trade relations between the two nations. In their joint statement, they emphasize the strengthening of cooperation mechanisms in areas including infrastructure, trade, agriculture, finance, currency, industrial investment. They explore the establishment of cooperation mechanisms in state-owned assets and enterprises and in the transportation sector. Special emphasis will be placed on promoting strategic alignment between the two countries and implementing a cooperation plan to jointly advance China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and align with Vietnam’s Two Corridors and One Economic Circle framework.
In terms of the depth and breadth of trade and economic relations with Vietnam, the United States currently lags China. However, recent developments in U.S.–Vietnam economic relations have accelerated, especially around Biden’s visit in September. The strategic agreement reached during the visit upgrades the U.S.–Vietnamese relationship from a “comprehensive partnership” to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” putting it on par with Chinese–Vietnamese and Russian–Vietnamese relations.
In a phone conversation in March, Biden and Nguyen Phu Trong, the general secretary of the CPV, reached a consensus on further deepening bilateral relations. Subsequently, a large business delegation of 52 U.S. companies from various industries (including technology, semiconductors, finance, energy, aircraft manufacturing, and health care) visited Vietnam. In July, Janet Yellen, U.S. secretary of the treasury, visited Vietnam and explicitly stated that the U.S. supports the diversification of supply chains to counter the impact of tensions with China. During Biden’s visit in September, three major initiatives requiring and reinforcing cooperation between the two nations were established: a resolution to focus on cooperation in high tech, artificial intelligence, and telecommunications; the formal launch of specific mechanisms for training in the semiconductor and high-tech industries, with an agreement on semiconductors and critical minerals to enhance collaboration and supply-chain security; and the signing of agreements and memoranda of understanding institutions and companies in both nations to lay the groundwork for further development of Vietnam’s green economy, digital economy, and high technology. The U.S. pledged support for Vietnam’s liquefied natural gas and offshore wind projects, as well as for joint efforts to advance the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).
Vietnam, like other countries in the region, especially in East Asia, understands that, while they are economically dependent on China to a considerable extent, that dependence can become a leverage for Chinese coercion. From a long-term strategic perspective, diversifying economic relations, particularly strengthening ties with the United States, is crucial. Vietnam has become the largest beneficiary of the U.S.-led strategy for supply-chain restructuring and is willing to play a critical role in the U.S.-led IPEF initiative.
Currently, the United States and China are evenly matched in their economic relations with Vietnam.
Regional Security: U.S. 1 point, China: 0 points
In recent years, as Beijing has militarized artificial islands and increased its maritime military presence to assert sovereignty in the South China Sea, tensions and security concerns in the region, particularly in Vietnam and other East Asian countries, have intensified. The sovereignty dispute in the South China Sea is a nonnegotiable principle for both Hanoi and Beijing. While the joint statement between China and Vietnam regarding Xi’s visit mentions better resolution and management of differences as well as mutual development and enhanced cooperation in the South China Sea, it is just a surface-level statement.
In its readout of Xi’s visit, Vietnam described a mutual agreement to “constantly consolidate political trust” and to build relations on the basis of “mutual respect, equality, and mutually beneficial cooperation” while respecting each other’s “independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” However, while emphasizing trust-building, China’s meeting records did not mention sovereignty and territorial integrity in the context of bilateral relations.
During Biden’s visit to Vietnam in September, a strategic agreement was reached that, while not explicitly naming China in the section on the sovereignty dispute in the South China Sea, emphasized a commitment to “steadfastly support the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, refrain from the threat or use of force, support freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded lawful commerce, and respect sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Regarding “defense and cooperation,” the agreement stated that the leaders of both countries welcomed further strengthening of defense-industry and defense-trade cooperation through mutually agreed mechanisms, with the United States committed to assist Vietnam in developing its self-reliant defense capabilities according to Vietnam’s needs and established mechanisms.
In balancing the strategic competition between the two great powers, Vietnam and other East Asian neighbors have followed the long-standing formula “economic reliance on China, security reliance on the United States.” As mentioned above, Vietnam has begun to balance its economic relations with both major powers. However, when it comes to safeguarding sovereignty in the South China Sea and regional security, there is no change in Vietnam’s greater trust in and reliance on the United States.
Conclusion
Despite Xi Jinping’s efforts to promote a so-called China–Vietnam Community of Shared Destiny, Nguyen Phu Trong is only reluctantly going along with it. Regardless of Vietnam’s response, the “China–Vietnam Community of Shared Destiny” cannot constrain the dynamic development of U.S.–Vietnamese relations. Meanwhile, for the United States, a “comprehensive strategic partnership” without a foundation of shared values is inherently unstable. Therefore, while deepening economic, trade, and regional security ties with Vietnam, the U.S. should not abandon the long-term strategic goal of promoting Vietnam’s peaceful democratic evolution.