His diplomatic maneuvers may have been important during the Cold War. But he set the stage for accommodation of the CCP’s worst tendencies in the years since.
His diplomatic maneuvers may have been important during the Cold War. But he set the stage for accommodation of the CCP’s worst tendencies in the years since.
D r. Henry Kissinger, described by successive CCP leaders as an “old friend of the Chinese people,” passed away on November 29 at the age of 100. He was a figure who could not be ignored by anyone paying attention to Sino–U.S. relations and the world order over the past half century. When I was a young boy, I first heard the title “doctor” (signifying a Ph.D.) in reference to Kissinger in the news reports of the CCP’s official media, which left the impression in my young mind that a “doctor” is a wise and resourceful person. No one denies that Dr. Kissinger was indeed wise and resourceful, but his form of realism devoid of fundamental values was an essential part of his cunning nature.
Upon hearing the news of Kissinger’s death, many major events in U.S.–China relations associated with him flashed through my mind. The most important, of course, was his secret visit to Beijing in July 1971, which broke the ice in the frozen relations between the United States and Communist China. At the time, China was in the throes of the Cultural Revolution, facing economic collapse, and the Sino-Soviet border conflict over the sovereignty of Zhenbao Island put China under direct military pressure from the Soviet Union. In the midst of internal and external difficulties, Mao Zedong turned to the United States for a diplomatic breakthrough. Meanwhile, the United States needed to “lean on China to resist the Soviet Union” and resolve the Vietnam War. In this 17-hour lightning visit, Kissinger pledged that the U.S. would gradually reduce its military presence in Taiwan, would not support “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan,” would not support Taiwan independence, and that the U.S. would support the People’s Republic of China in obtaining seats in the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council. They then issued a joint communiqué, announcing that President Nixon would visit China before May 1972 and meet with CCP leaders, particularly Mao. Without exaggeration, Kissinger helped the CCP overcome internal and external difficulties, thus removing the first obstacles to Red China’s emergence on the international political stage.
For half a century, realism in diplomacy, as represented by Kissinger, has been the mainstay of U.S. policy toward China, and even the massive international shockwaves caused by the Tiananmen Square incident did not fundamentally affect it. On June 4, 1989, ABC News interviewed Kissinger about the ongoing Tiananmen Square Massacre. The host, Peter Jennings, asked him, “What should America do, Dr. Kissinger?” He replied, “I wouldn’t [impose] any sanctions [on China].” Kissinger went on to write articles in several media outlets defending the CCP’s atrocities, stating that the events in Beijing should not be viewed solely in terms of good and evil; the CCP’s massacre, Kissinger argued, was a choice for a more benevolent, stable, and peaceful process for China. Under this kind of realism, which prioritizes practical interests over moral values, Washington’s China policy helped the CCP quickly emerge from international isolation after the Tiananmen incident and gradually enter the world-trade and global-governance systems without any predetermined political conditions.
For Kissinger, a realism devoid of fundamental values was not only reflected in the international relations he guided or influenced but also permeated his personal interests. He was an honored guest of successive CCP leaders and visited China over 100 times, more than any other American politician. He expressed his admiration for the CCP in his book On China, which is considered a must-read by Western scholars to understand China. When the Tiananmen incident occurred, Kissinger had just launched the China Investment Fund in cooperation with China’s state-owned CITIC Group. Upon learning this fact, Jennings deeply regretted giving Kissinger airtime, saying, “If I knew then what I know now, I wouldn’t have let him appear on that program.” Kissinger’s support for Bo Xilai, then a powerful rival of Xi Jinping, in 2011 further illustrates his opportunism and calculation. At the time, Bo Xilai was gaining momentum and making his presence known through the “Sing Red, Strike Black” campaign to challenge the CCP’s succession plan for Xi Jinping. The power struggle was intense, and the outcome was unpredictable. In June of that year, to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, Chongqing held a “Red Song Concert” attended by tens of thousands, and Kissinger made a special appearance in support of Bo Xilai.
Kissinger’s “values-free realism” is closely aligned with the “pragmatic soft power” developed by the CCP in the post-Tiananmen era. It was largely “pragmatic soft power” that helped the CCP overcome difficulties after the Tiananmen incident, stabilize domestic rule, and expand its influence in the international community.
After the Tiananmen Square Massacre, the CCP, on the one hand, instilled fear in the people to maintain the lack of checks and balances on power in society; and, on the other hand, encouraged them, especially the elite, not to ask questions about politics or right versus wrong, and to focus solely on making money. This strategy ensured that, in the short term, the worst form of capitalism demonstrated high efficiency and competitiveness under poor human-rights conditions and low morality. Driven by the success of this brutal pragmatism domestically, the CCP began to use this “pragmatic soft power” to support its continued rise and international expansion, in competition with the United States. This “pragmatic soft power,” which focuses on economic interests while ignoring values and morals, can be described as disregard for human rights plus disdain for democratic values plus lust for money. It has proved appealing in many parts of the world.
It is undeniable that the normalization of U.S.–China relations, promoted by Kissinger and others, has had positive implications for both countries. However, Kissingerian realism in U.S. foreign policy, and in the U.S. policy toward China dominated by this ideology for half a century, especially in the post-Tiananmen era, not only failed to lead to greater freedom and democracy in China — while China’s economy rapidly developed into the world’s second largest — but also strengthened the CCP’s grip on power with China’s newly gained economic stature. As a result, the CCP became even more authoritarian domestically, flaunted and implemented its global ambitions on the international stage, and began to pose an existential threat to the U.S.-led, rules-based world order, a threat that is graver today than ever before. This is a profound lesson.
Since the “White Paper Movement” last year, Xi Jinping has faced repeated setbacks in politics, economics, society, and diplomacy. He has found many obstacles between capacity and ambition, and he needs to return to the path of “keeping a low profile” of the Deng-Jiang-Hu era, easing relations with the market and the United States in exchange for another strategic window of opportunity, and allowing China’s economic, technological, military, and diplomatic strength to catch up with his ambitions. Thus, last month, Xi Jinping transformed himself from a “wolf warrior” into a “panda,” smilingly meeting with the U.S. president and having dinner with the U.S. business community to launch a charm offensive. In July 2023, Xi hosted a birthday banquet for Kissinger, who had just turned 100, with the highest honors in Beijing. During the banquet, Xi again proclaimed that Kissinger was an “old friend of the Chinese people” and emphasized that “the Chinese people value relationships and loyalty and will not forget old friends.” Xi, of course, knows the subtle use of “old friends” at this moment.
“Doctor” Kissinger is gone, but “Kissingerism” still has a wide market. Have Americans learned its lessons?