President Obama’s secret letter to Russian president Dmitri Medvedev has, as promised, “pressed the reset button” on U.S.–Russian relations. The president has offered to abandon America’s planned deployment of an anti-missile shield in Eastern Europe in exchange for Russia’s help against Iran’s nuclear-weapons program. This is an enormous diplomatic blunder that will encourage the very worst sort of conduct from Russia — and Iran.
The president’s proposal has superficial appeal. If, as the United States has repeatedly assured Russia, the shield is directed at Iranian, not Russian, missiles, the deal might seem to make sense: better to keep nuclear weapons out of Iran’s hands in the first place than to erect a shield against them. Yet this is to ignore both Russia’s backing of Iran’s nuclear program and the missile shield’s place in the strategic relationship between the U.S., Russia, and the still-newly-free states of Eastern Europe.
Iran’s imminent nuclear capability is a problem largely of Russia’s making. At a hefty profit, Russia has built Iran a nuclear plant at Bushehr, which is expected to be operational by summer. At the same time, Russia has consistently pulled the teeth from U.N. resolutions aimed at sanctioning Iran’s nuclear program. If, as some believe, Iran already has enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb, Russia’s supply of technology and expertise will have been very much to blame.
The missile shield may have been aimed at Iranian missiles, but in a different sense, it is aimed at Russia. The shield acts as a gauge of the U.S. commitment to Eastern Europe’s independence from Russia. Its deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic was meant to create a tie more reassuring to those living in Russia’s strategic shadow than mere NATO membership.
Russia’s fierce opposition to the missile shield springs from these very same considerations. Military reasons alone cannot explain it; the shield — designed to block one or two rockets from Iran — has no chance of undermining Russia’s strategic deterrent. It signaled, however, that the U.S. viewed Russia’s former satellites as equal members of the democratic West, and no longer Russia’s to impose upon. The agreement to base anti-missile missiles in Poland was part of the West’s otherwise weak response to Russia’s invasion of Georgia last summer. Russia responded by threatening to attack Poland with nuclear weapons.
The Obama administration presumably knows all this. They know about Russia’s support for Iran’s nuclear program and its ambition to resume its domination of the countries of the former Soviet Empire. Yet instead of holding Russia accountable for abetting Iran’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, President Obama has invited Medvedev and Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin to name their price for some vague and unspecified “assistance” in controlling a problem that they deliberately created.
The White House has, of course, backtracked. Administration spokesmen protest that the president’s letter proposed no quid pro quo, and that the U.S. commitment to its allies in Eastern Europe is “in no way” reduced. But actions speak louder than words. Leaders in Warsaw, Prague, Tbilisi, and Kiev will not overlook that the U.S. offer to Russia was made in secret. Unless the Obama administration changes course quickly, Eastern Europe’s new democracies will draw the appropriate conclusions.
The president’s offer reinforces lessons that the Kremlin has already learned too well. In the past decade, Russia has repeatedly blocked and threatened to block gas supplies to the West, often in the middle of winter. It has pressured Kyrgyzstan into closing a U.S. base vital to supplying U.S. troops in Afghanistan, irradiated the streets of London, fomented rebellion in neighboring countries, and invaded a democratic neighbor. Russia’s thuggish behavior has met only success and mumbled outrage. If the Kremlin has not accepted President Obama’s opening offer, it is because Medvedev and Putin think they can extort a better one.
There could be no worse time to show Russia that the U.S. will reward bad behavior. First of all, it is unclear what Russia can do to stop Iran’s nuclear program at this point, even if it wants to. Worse, the U.S. has already become vulnerable to the Kremlin’s favorite hardball tactic. Putin and Medvedev have used Russia’s control over the flow of energy to Western Europe to great effect, and now, having choked off U.S. supply routes to Afghanistan through Kyrgyzstan, Russia controls a pipeline of a different sort: On the same day that news of Obama’s secret overture leaked, the first shipment of supplies to U.S. forces in Afghanistan passed through Russia.
The Obama administration’s show of weakness will encourage Russia to treat the U.S. as it does Europe. Threats to U.S. supply lines will be used to extort all manner of concessions. Will the United States be pressured to mute its criticism of Russia’s human-rights abuses and the Kremlin’s links to organized crime? To recognize Russia’s extravagant claims in the Arctic? To exclude Georgia and Ukraine from NATO? To abandon Georgia if Russia launches another offensive? Where will the Obama administration draw the line?
The irony is that the United States is not in nearly as weak a position as President Obama’s letter might suggest. There are many ways by which the U.S. could more responsibly induce Russia to stop sponsoring Iran’s nuclear program. The Obama administration could, for example, practice some of the “smart diplomacy” that it promised during the last election. Russia’s tightly interconnected political and business elite have vast wealth and extensive interests in Western countries. The U.S. and allied governments could unravel the complex schemes used by cronies of Putin and Medvedev to launder and stash vast sums of money abroad. This would provide excellent opportunities to both punish and reward Russian behavior through the use of “soft power.” The U.S. could also announce that the growing Iranian nuclear threat may require further expansion of U.S. anti-missile defenses, leaving the ball in Russia’s court.
Time is running out for such steps. If the Obama administration does not adopt a firmer tone, not only Russia, but also Iran, will quickly learn to discount U.S. resolve.
– Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky practices international law in Washington, D.C.