Jordanian-Iraqi relations have entered a new and as yet unclear phase, following decades of complex and complicated relations that will inevitably impact on the future relationship. While all sides — Jordanian, U.S., British, and most Iraqi — appear willing and even eager to see close relations develop, the controversial and often contradictory ties between the two states in the past make predicting the future extremely difficult.
King Abdullah’s lingering support of Saddam during the buildup to war was all too strong a reminder of King Hussein’s strong support prior to and during the Gulf War I. The Jordanian monarchy’s unwillingness or inability to differentiate between the Iraqi dictator and the people created a gap between the two culturally and demographically close peoples.
Jordan will remain a primary corridor for Iraqi exports and imports, and will benefit in various ways from its special relations with the United States. However, Amman has limited relations with all but one of Iraq’s emerging political groups and that single relationship is negative. It will take significant support from Washington’s administrative advisers to the anticipated provisional government in Baghdad for Jordan to maintain what has been a “special relationship” with its eastern neighbor, including being the foremost beneficiary of Iraq’s oil wealth.
Transferring Jordan’s previous status as a strategic ally of the despotic Saddam Baathist regime that destroyed Iraq and its people, to a readily accepted, natural ally of a new Iraqi democracy will take time. It will be particularly difficult to effect such a change under the current Jordanian Prime Minister Ali Abu-al Ragheb, or other members of Amman’s current political establishment.
Amman does have ways to open a new chapter with the Iraqi people, if the government is able to form a bold, quick, and transparent plan, one which would be synchronous to U.S. strategy. Jordan’s royal family has special relations with several Iraqi tribes and religious scholars. King Abdullah’s paternal uncle, former Crown Prince Hassan has strong ties with former opposition personalities, both civilian and military. Iraqi admiration for Jordan’s functioning democracy, albeit under a monarch which only some 20 percent of Iraqis favor, could be turned to Jordan’s favor.
The Jordanian government’s immediate objectives must be to do everything possible to protect several important agreements with Baghdad. One would increase bilateral trade from $260 million to $310 million during 2003. An oil accord that saved approximately $400 million last year estimated Jordan’s oil needs for 2003 at four million tons of crude and one million tons of oil derivatives, to be sold on a discounted $19.50 per barrel price base, as opposed to a market price of $30 or more per barrel. The agreement included an article, renewed every year for more than a decade, in which oil derivatives worth $300 million were to be given to Jordan annually as a “gift” from ousted President Saddam Hussein.
The United States clearly appreciates Jordan’s support, despite significant popular opposition and financial losses caused by the war. In May, Washington announced a $700 million aid package, to be followed by $400 million in military assistance, both in addition to $450 million it will continue to receive annually from the U.S. Not only had Abdullah generally, if carefully, supported the U.S. position prior to the outbreak of hostilities, his government had secretly allowed U.S. special forces to enter western Iraq from its territory.
The $1.1 billion in new aid is part of an additional $8 billion assistance from Washington to its regional allies, including Egypt, Afghanistan, Israel, and Pakistan. In addition, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates filled Jordan’s petroleum needs for three months, to compensate for oil shipments halted from Iraq, previously Jordan’s sole supplier.
All this leaves the ambitious but careful King Abdullah in the midst of multiple predicaments. He must cobble together a viable set of economic and commercial agreements to replace the extraordinarily favorable Iraqi. He must identify his government with the recently liberated aspirations of the Iraqi people. Moreover, he must mollify his own population, disappointed as they are with his supporting the Coalition’s invasion of Iraq, as they face serious economic hardship.
While it is not clear that the young, skilled monarch can continue to maintain his balance in his nation’s highly charged political arena; Abdullah’s survival is neither more nor less obscure than how Jordanian-Iraqi relations will evolve in the post- Saddam era. Unclear but changing … in the Arab world, ’twas ever thus.
— Hussain Hindawi is a native Iraqi historian, humanitarian, and journalist who currently serves as editor of United Press International’s Arabic News Service. John R. Thomson has been involved in the Middle East since 1966 as businessman, diplomat, and journalist. This piece was written for UPI and is reprinted with permission.