May 18, 2005, 8:08 a.m.
Look Who’s Talking
What the terrorists say and what we tell.

I am always intrigued by public reports of the outcome of terrorist takedowns. A few days after an important mischief-maker is rounded up we begin to see scattered, often conflicting reports about what came out of it. The terrorist talked. He isn’t giving us anything. He is more important than we thought. He’s a nobody, small fry. He was close to bin Laden. He never heard of bin Laden. He was not who we thought he was. We got him just in time.

Should we believe any of this? Consider the sources. After all, if you are trying to run a clandestine shadow war against the most elusive people on the planet, why get reporters involved? The only sensible reason would be to shape terrorist perceptions, to keep them off balance, to help them make mistakes. Given this (among other reasons), I am inclined to believe the opposite of whatever the press says.

Take Abu Faraj al-Libbi. He quickly went from a critical bin Laden associate, Khalid Sheik Mohammed’s successor, putative al Qaeda #3, to being called a nobody. Reports had it that he had nothing to offer, he was the wrong guy, a dead end. Maybe true — or maybe intended to generate a false sense of security. Soon after Faraj was apprehended there were several other take-downs in Pakistan. The CIA felt that the catch was significant enough that they took out Haitham al-Yemeni (whom they were following in hopes of finding bin Laden) before he went into hiding. Currently there is significant and underreported activity going on in western Pakistan, particularly north Waziristan near where Faraj was captured. A source told me that the information leaking out is the tip of the iceberg. He added that he did not think the Coalition was going to catch bin Laden. I said, surely, some day we will get him, if he is alive. The source said, “I meant this week.”

Another example is Ghassan Muhammad Amin Husayn, a Musab al-Zarqawi associate captured in Iraq in late April. He was credited with being a great help to Coalition forces in prosecuting the recent Operation Matador against terrorist infiltration routes from Syria. His tips reputedly helped the Marines kill or capture 60 bad guys. Another Zarqawi stalwart, Ammar al-Zubaydi, was said to be similarly helpful. But were they really talking? Suppose they held firm, we got nothing out of them, they did al Qaeda proud. What better way to reward them than to announce that they are helpful collaborators? It is a win-win for the Coalition — the real sources that helped make Matador a success can keep supplying information, and Ghassan and Ammar are looking at the bad end of a fatwah. If they did talk, it sends the signal that even important leaders will sell out the movement, and there could still be informants inside the insurgency.

But don’t any captives protect their fellows? Don’t they show devotion to their comrades and their cause? Take Azmi Jayousi, a Jordanian loyal to Zarqawi, currently on trial with a dozen other terrorists for plotting a chemical attack in Jordan last year. The courtroom has been a daily scene of defiance as Jayousi denounces the court, the king, and others on his personal list. “Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi will chop off your heads and stuff them in your mouths, you enemies of God!” Jayousi pledged from the dock, throwing his shoes at the judge. Co-conspirator Ahmad Samir added, “The blood of our brothers will not go wasted!”

Oh, but if Ahmad only knew what kind of person he was keeping company with. Moments after these outbursts, Jordanian security officers took the stand and blew the whistle on Jayousi. Despite his bluster in the courtroom, the terror leader had in fact been instrumental in taking down his entire band. When counterterrorist forces raided his hideout just before the planned chemical attack was launched, Jayousi did not fight to the death, he did not resist at all. He began cutting side deals on the spot. No torture, no coercion — Jayousi rolled right away and gave up the locations of all the other safe houses. Later in court when Jayousi denounced the story as a lie, the Jordanians, who videotape all their operations, released footage to the press showing the entire thing. It must have been an uncomfortable scene back in the holding cell that night. Say it ain’t so, Azmi.

Revelations like this are rare, but that is a good thing. Very few people need to know what captured terrorists are saying, if anything. It can serve no interest for that kind of sensitive intelligence to become public. If a credulous press passes on unsourced rumors about the relative value of a given captive, then caveat lector. It adds nothing to our understanding of what is really going on in the war on terrorism. As the president told the nation nine days after the 9/11 attacks, this is a war unlike any we have ever fought, in which victories may be “dramatic strikes visible on TV” or “covert operations secret even in success.” Best not to confuse the two.

— James S. Robbins is senior fellow in national-security affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council and an NRO contributor.