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O.K., so weren't we here a few months ago? The exact same script was played out after the March 27 "Passover Bombing" in Netanya. Remember? The siege lasted about a month before Israel withdrew after promise of a ceasefire. The promise was almost immediately broken and the tanks rolled again. More negotiations, and another ceasefire, of sorts. The last successful suicide attack before last Wednesday was August 4. Then on September 18, an Islamic Jihad suicide bomber killed a policeman and wounded several others when stopped at Umm al-Fahm junction in northern Israel. The next day, a bus explosion in Tel Aviv killed six and wounded 60. Hamas took credit, in retaliation for deaths of two of its leaders. As before, Arafat denounced the actions of the radicals, and called for an end to attacks against civilian targets in Israel. However, he couldn't take concerted action against his radicals because he needs them to maintain the illusion he is moderate. The rest followed. But why would the terrorists attack now? Look at the context of the Netanya massacre. The Saudi peace plan had just been introduced at the Arab summit in Beirut, and the final communiqué from that meeting was fairly noncommittal on the issue of an attack on Iraq (compared, that is, to Arab invective on the Palestinian issue). Two interests were engaged: those of radical Palestinians and their state supporters who did not want the "moderate" (code word for 1967 borders as opposed to 1948 borders or none at all) Saudi plan to gain traction; and of Saddam Hussein, who cannot allow peace to break out in Israel at the risk of losing his only issue around which he can rally Arab support. So domestic terror attacks commenced, Israel was provoked, the Saudi peace plan was put on the backburner, and the U.S. was distracted. American domestic opponents of vigorous action against Iraq argued that resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue was a necessary precondition of regime change in Baghdad, the argument stuck, the Iraq question was pretty much forgotten, at least for awhile. Six months later, things were not looking good in the region for Iraq and the other radical states that fear the expansion of American influence. George Bush had masterfully altered the terms of debate in the U.N., and transformed the diplomatic front from an alternative to military action to a component of a combined military-diplomatic offensive strategy. U.S. forces continued their buildup in the region, and stockpiles of advanced weapons depleted during Operation Enduring Freedom were being replenished. Several European states (Britain and Italy) had signed on to helping solve the Iraq problem, and even Saddam's Arab neighbors were beginning to resign themselves to the inevitable. But Saddam Hussein did not get to be a world-class dictator by sitting back and letting events take their course. He too is pursuing a two-pronged offensive, with distinct diplomatic and military components. The diplomatic side has been playing out in the last week, as the Iraqis (as predicted) roll out the numerous and growing list of conditions to their offer of "unconditional" access to U.N. weapons inspectors. And there's the military component: to engage the Israelis using terrorist proxies, court a strong response from Prime Minister Sharon, bring about the Arab unity Saddam desperately needs, shift the topic to the Palestinian issue, and hopefully force a wedge between the U.S. and the Arab states. While most analysts are focusing on the consequences of an Iraqi WMD attack on Tel Aviv to forge Arab unity after an American attack has begun, Saddam is using the lower end of the conflict spectrum to bring about the same result before we start the bombing. It is certainly safer than facing Israeli nuclear retaliation. Moreover, it demonstrates that the United States is not the only country in the world that can pursue a strategy of preemption. Palestinian Authority Minister Ghassan Khatib denies any link between the timing of the renewed terror offensive and the growing momentum against Saddam's regime. "I see no link with Iraq," he said. "The suicide attackers always swing into action as soon as they can. They are driven by circumstantial considerations such as the presence of Israeli patrols on the ground, or the availability of explosives and of people capable of manufacturing the bombs." So, it's basically random. All depends on when they can put the bombs together. What the patrol schedules are. Right. Unfortunately for the terrorists and their backers, the current crisis isn't getting as much media play as last time. The novelty of the initial incursion and widespread fear of a general conflagration made last spring's imbroglio the lead story for weeks. However, the feared escalation didn't materialize, a negotiated solution was reached, and the situation calmed down. Also, this time around the press may be a little more skeptical they may still be smarting from falling for the contrived "Jenin massacre" story, which they hyped to the hilt before a U.N. study found the PA claims to be groundless. The Bush administration has also not responded to the current crisis with the same degree of interest as the first. This is encouraging it shows their unwillingness to allow the adversary to shape the battlefield. Given that, the implications for U.S. policymakers are: 1. Let the Israelis take the lead in settling the latest manifestation of the Palestinian terror problem. It didn't spin out of control the first time, it won't this time either. Neither will a long-term solution be concluded while state sponsors of terrorism continue to wield influence; 2. Stay focused on the Iraq issue. Don't divert resources or sap momentum and get bogged down in the Israeli-Palestinian morass. Continue to pursue the diplomatic offensive against Iraq while simultaneously developing capabilities to exercise military options. Remember Frederick the Great's dictum, "Diplomacy without force is like music without instruments"; 3. If the Arab states insist on establishing linkage between the two issues, up the ante. Begin a frank discussion of Arab support for terrorist organizations generally, particularly Palestinian groups. Find out who the real state sponsors of terror are. Get the whole issue out in the open. See if any other state in the region wants to make the target list. Show sincere willingness to accommodate them. Postscript: Palestinian attacks last spring coincided with a statement from fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar that U.S. assets should also be attacked. This time we have a similar statement from Gulboddin Hekmatyar, a former Afghan Mujahed, leader of the Hezb-i-Islami group, who was recently expelled from his sanctuary in Iran. He has "declared jihad against the foreign and U.S. presence" in Afghanistan. He notes that, "the United States is the largest terrorist country, and is the mother and sponsor of terrorism. It supports the Israeli entity with weapons, which kill the Palestinians." I hope someone in CENTCOM is listening and remembers what happened when we ignored a terrorist leader of this stature declaring war on the United States back in 1996. In any sane universe, this statement should mean that Hekmatyar would be coming soon to home video on Predator-cam, that is. James S. Robbins is a national-security analyst & NRO contributor. |
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