July
15, 2003, 2:30 p.m. Rules
for Intervention
Principles
for Liberias — present and future.
ne
of the problems for U.S. foreign policy is that its practitioners tend
to be over-influenced by the last crisis and its outcome. Like generals
fighting the last war, U.S. diplomats make mistakes by trying desperately
to avoid the mistakes they made last time. Thus, the fiasco in Somalia
— where the U.S. intervened from humanitarian motives, allowed "mission
creep" to turn this limited exercise into nation-building, and then
retreated in disorder when U.S. troops were killed in a major skirmish
— led directly to President Clinton's refusal to intervene to halt
the genocide in Rwanda a few years later.
Hundreds of thousands
died in that genocide. Collateral damage included the West's integrity
when the leading Western nations refused to admit that Rwanda was genocide
because that would have legally obliged them to intervene under a U.N.
Convention they had signed without really thinking through its implications.
And Rwanda replaced Somalia as the last awful warning.
Rwanda is now persuading
many people in Washington that the U.S. must now intervene in Liberia
to establish civil order and to save the people there from criminal gangs,
some called government troops, and others "rebels," who murder
and mutilate at random in a war without frontiers to corner the lucrative
West African diamond trade.
Saving Liberia is
an indubitably "good cause." And if the long-running Liberian
civil war had intruded on our consciousness a few months ago, the relatively
easy success of the Iraq military campaign might have removed all objections
to U.S. intervention. But because the U.S. now seems to be enmeshed in
an indefinite struggle against Baathist guerrillas, the Bush administration
is somewhat nervous about getting involved in yet another conflict.
Most of the pressure
for Liberian intervention comes from human-rights groups, Democrats, and
the liberal Left in general who like U. S. military action to be purely
humanitarian and untainted as far as possible by grubby national self-interest.
In fact, a good rule of thumb is that if someone supported the war in
Iraq, they probably don't want to intervene in Liberia — and if they
didn't, they do.
What we need is to
get away from concentrating on the last crisis-and to lay down a few commonsense
principles for dealing with Liberia and future crises like it.
And having enunciated the principles, let us apply to them this first
case.
1. In foreign policy, prudence governs all and no principle is absolutely
sacred.
2. Humanitarianism is not enough. If the crisis has no effect on American
interests, then we should be extremely reluctant to put American GIs in
harm's way in order to resolve it. We might intervene diplomatically,
or give various forms of aid either through U.S. agencies, nongovernmental
organizations and private charities, or assist in post-crisis peacekeeping.
Only in the most exceptional circumstances (see point #1), however, should
the U.S. take the military lead in a humanitarian intervention. And, of
course, we should never sign grand international declarations that either
commit us to such interventions irrespective of our government's judgment
— or oblige us to become hypocrites, denying the crime because we
don't want to be the policeman. Liberia is a real humanitarian crisis.
We can afford to say so-and leave it at that if we wish.
3. National interest is needed to justify intervention — but national
interest is not always self-evident. Before September 11, few Americans
would have thought that removing Taliban rule from Afghanistan was an
important U.S. interest. It was. Arguably, a stable Liberia and its crisis-ridden
neighbors, Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast, are a significant long-term
U.S. interest on two grounds. To start with, allowing these countries
to crumble into "failed states" would create the same breeding
ground for terrorism that existed in Afghanistan in 2001. Second, instability
in West Africa might threaten a region that official estimates suggest
will supply 20 percent of oil imports in the near future. Remember that
the largest West African state, Nigeria, is both a major oil producer
and the site of growing conflict between Christians and radical Muslims.
Avoiding the "Lebanonization" of West Africa would justify at
least come commitment of U.S. forces.
4. But be realistic, not optimistic, about the costs of intervention.
As the continuing turmoil in Iraq shows, it is better to intervene with
excessive force than with inadequate manpower. Fortunately, if the experience
of the British in Sierra Leone is any guide, establishing order in Liberia
could probably be done with a force of a few thousand good troops.
5. Even so, where possible, have allies to share the burdens of intervention.
Such allies, however, must (a) have good long-term interests of their
own to persuade them to stay the course, and (a) a willingness to bring
real resources to the table. Nations with an interest in Liberian stability
are Britain (which is maintaining the peace in Sierra Leone), France (ditto
in the Ivory Coast), and Liberia's other West African neighbors. The most
that can be expected from other West African countries is a modest commitment
of troops who will have to be retrained for their new roles. But Britain
and France are both significant military powers with experience in putting
out "brushfire wars," a sense of post-colonial obligation, and
local involvement.
6. As well a national interest to justify intervention, however, you also
need a clear aim — which does not necessarily include an exit strategy.
Somalia was a pointless intervention. The U.S. arrived, restored some
kind of order, and then left, allowing chaos to resume. Liberia and West
Africa need a long-term program to restore stability and government —
not just a quick fix to a civil war that could be easily resumed.
These principles
would seem to require something more ambitious than a brief U.S.-led intervention
in Liberia — something on the lines of an Anglo-French-U.S. condominium
that, with the collaboration of West African states, would not only restore
order in failing states there but also provide them with 30 years of good
government in which civil society, an open free-market economy, and a
tradition of democratic political restraint might develop and take root.
In other words — liberal imperialism.
If Washington thinks
it cannot achieve that, it had better not intervene in the first place.
—
John O'Sullivan is editor-at-large of National Review. A version
of this piece ran in the Chicago Sun-Times; it is reprinted with
permission.
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ne
of the problems for U.S. foreign policy is that its practitioners tend
to be over-influenced by the last crisis and its outcome. Like generals
fighting the last war, U.S. diplomats make mistakes by trying desperately
to avoid the mistakes they made last time. Thus, the fiasco in Somalia
— where the U.S. intervened from humanitarian motives, allowed "mission
creep" to turn this limited exercise into nation-building, and then
retreated in disorder when U.S. troops were killed in a major skirmish
— led directly to President Clinton's refusal to intervene to halt
the genocide in Rwanda a few years later. 
